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ABSTRACT 
 
 The immigrant integration process became popular in literature, while hybridization 
studies have gained little space. Exploring the characteristics of the formation of Kazakh identity 
in Turkey and the prominent features, with a survey study consisting of sample of 93 (N=93) 
participants. The participants served as subjects in a study designed to investigate how hybrid 
identities are constructed. The results revealed that Kazakhs attached a new kind of hybrid 
identity with more emphasize on Turkic roots and they reconstructed their ethnic identity which 
is not a product of assimilated fragile identity through globalization trends, but it is a new form 
of alive cultural and ethnic identity which carries its own values, preferences and its historical 
treasures from their past but acquires new traits from its Turkic identity at the same time. The 
paper also makes the case that studying Kirgiz in Turkey could improve this study by comparing 
those similar groups whether their identity formation traced similar way.  
 
 
1 
 
                                                                  CHAPTER 1 
                                                              INTRODUCTION 
 This thesis involves an analysis about the characteristic of Kazakh ethnic identity 
formation in Turkey. This chapter begins with explanations over ethnic identity and its scope in 
hybridization theory. Later, it concentrates on research objective and brief historical background 
about Kazakhs who immigrated from Xinjiang -an inner Chinese autonomous region- to Turkey. 
Finally, this chapter ends with thesis outline. 
Every individual puts forth a different feature when describing their personality. Some 
individuals emphasize their ethnic origins, while others put more emphasis on their religion. In 
the last 30 years, globalization and its ramifications on ethnic identity have become popular 
among scholars. Researchers share some common views about characteristics when they define 
ethnic identity. It can be defined that individual placed himself/herself on ethnicity which could 
vary and the perception about a shared common origin and culture are the main parts of ethnic 
identity definition that carries some features from the past. One such feature is that ethnic 
identity does not have borders, harboring many grey areas. It is also a concept subject to constant 
change. Recent developments in technology, communication, and transportation play an 
important role in radically changing individuals’ and communities’ immigration efforts. On the 
other hand, immigrants are more aware of protecting their own values; they are able to travel to 
their homelands more frequently, have easier access to historical information. Communities in 
host countries are more understanding towards immigrants.  
2 
Immigrants have a different approach towards identity. They harbor values from the two 
countries they have lived in, from different cultures, and even different civilizations
1
. They 
integrate the host country’s values into their own if those values are similar, creating a hybrid 
identity, thus, contributing to the formation of multi-ethnic societies, cities, and families. 
 Overall, new cultural or ethnic hybrid identities are formed through increasing cross-
cultural communication, migration, intermarriage or adoption of new cultural values. Many 
authors and researchers often emphasize that globalization has many effects on cultures not only 
on economy, while globalization does not mean purely Westernization. They also argue that 
local cultures have pressurizing and directive effects in the greater order
2
.  
Researchers have paid ample amount of attention to the relationship between 
globalization and economic assets. Concerning this relationship, in one way, the economic 
unification of the globe appears more attractive to study. Therefore studying cultural 
globalization has always been attracted the attention of smaller group. This thesis emphasizes the 
issue of ethnical and cultural consequences of globalization. Three dominant paradigms situate 
the relationship between culture and globalization
3
. I am going examine the three approaches 
                                                          
1
 According to Huntington’s famous theory—clash of civilizations-- a civilization is “the highest cultural grouping of 
people and people in the broadest level of cultural identity has short of that which distinguishes humans from 
other species” (Huntington, 1993:24) and the most important division among peoples is cultural rather than 
ideological or economic in the modern world. People belongs different kind of civilizations that there are 8 major 
civilizations: some of them stemming from religion such as Orthodox, Hindu and Islamic, some of them stemming 
from race such as Japanese and Sinic, while for some the regional unity form the civilizations such as Western, 
Latin American and African. The source of conflict stems from the cultural fault lines between civilizations. And, 
immigrants have gained special positions by immigrating one civilization to another.  
2
 Concerning globalization as Westernization does not valid anymore. According to Pieterse “growing awareness of 
cultural difference is function of globalization in virtue of increasing cross-cultural communication, mobility, 
migration, trade, investment, tourism”( Pieterse, 1996:1393).  
3
 Pieterse’ approach stresses three globalization perspectives which are globalization as Westernization, 
globalization as Polarization and globalization as Hybridization. She argues that growing worldwide 
interconnectedness created more standardized world owing to modernization which is stemming from the West. 
Furthermore, the spread of Western hegemony and its opponents create a kind of clash among civilizations. This 
3 
(see chapter 3). First one is homogenization theory, which supports a part of cultural 
convergence, is a product of globalization. Second is polarization theory, which points out 
cultural oppositions between Western dominated globalization and rest of the world. Third is 
hybridization theory, which claims a process resulting from the cross-border exchanges by 
mixing different kind of races and cultures. One of major finding of this study is that 
hybridization captures better than the any others on what happened to Kazakhs by immigrated to 
Turkey, while all three perspectives have merits regarding of migration. Indeed I discussed 
Pieterse (1996)’s approach which stress those three perspectives and then showed that where 
those work. For example, the clash of civilizations, polarization approach, suits there was a class 
of civilizations in 1990s between Bosnian Serbian and Bosnian Muslims. For homogenization, 
there are elements of homogenization or Americanization, one can see everywhere, especially in 
economy. However, in the case of Kazakh migrants to Turkey, hybridization perspective 
captures better than the any others on what happened to Kazakhs by immigrated to Turkey. 
Overall, I am comparing these three perspectives which I will discuss further in Chapter 3. I then 
sought to see which fits best the phenomenon of Kazakh immigrants in Turkey. As I will argue 
later, the hybridization perspective captures better than the others to explain the migrated Kazakh 
community in Turkey. I established this by interviews with 93 Kazakh participants in Turkey 
during the months of January-February, 2015. In order to decide whether hybridization occurred 
among Kazakhs in Turkey, I focused on their ethnic identity retention and self-identification, 
followed by a creation of hybrid statements and new meanings for both identity and culture. 
Migration causes both dislocation and deterritorialization, and it foster the way of the 
process of hybridization (Garcia Canclini, 1995). Canclini attempts to reveal that how cultural 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
approach is called polarization. While Pieterse’s argument stresses the feature of globalization that rises to a global 
mélange, which is hybridization. 
4 
transformation is a natural process and constitutive dialectic between structure and human 
agency. Structure and human movements constructs society through integration and 
hybridization by migration flows .Therefore, cultural hybridization is a phenomenon that occurs 
when individuals and social groups encounter others and embrace new changes; the success and 
failure depend on their personal and community resources” (Dear & Burried, 2005:304). 
The case for understanding the reasons that transform culture, ethnicity and their 
respective outcomes requires much attention. The process of transformation is volatile, complex, 
and multilayered. It is important to find how the link between structure and cultural change is 
articulated. Arjun Appadurai’s classification about encounters of cultures will help clarify the 
argument. Appdurai (1990) classifies the encounters of cultures in five groups: “ethnoscapes 
(tourists, immigrants, refugees, etc.), mediascapes (radio, television, etc), technoscapes (low and 
high technology transfers), finanscapes (capital flows), and ideoscapes (ideologies) (cited in 
Husted, 2001:6). Every one of these flows has resulted in the spread and advancement of ideas in 
novel cultural forms and their effect on ethnic identity formation is examined throughout this 
study. 
Study Objectives 
This research is to seek a theory which explains best Kazakhs
4
 identity formation and 
their immigration to Turkey and their ethnic identity formation. Exploring the characteristics of 
the formation of Kazakh identity in Turkey and the prominent features, with a survey study 
consisting of sample of 93 (N=93) participants. Four Kazakhstani-born, three Chinese-born and 
eighty six Turkish-born Kazakhs who were selected using snowball (reputational) sampling was 
                                                          
4
 Kazakhs are Turkic people who have settled in Central Asia (primarily Kazakhstan, Afghanistan and China) (Guo, et 
al., 2014:14) 
5 
used for this study. Moreover, it includes a detailed historical part in order to produce written 
documentation on Kazakh exodus and their lives in Turkey. This research, in particular, 
examines the internal and external aspects of Kazakh identity and general overview about 
Kazakh settlements in Turkey. Hence, it is examining the relationship between Kazak ethnic 
identity and its ties with Turkic identity.  
 The following chapter begins with background information on the Kazakhs, followed by 
a brief introduction to the Kazakh ethnic group in Turkey and then the importance of this study 
with a snapshot of chapters. 
Kazakh People of Xinjiang up to 1949  
Xinjiang, or China’s the biggest autonomous region, is bordered by the Mongolian 
People’s Republic on the east, Russia on the north, India and The Tibet Autonomous Region on 
the south, Afghanistan and the distributed territory of Kashmir on the southwest, Kazakhstan on 
the northwest, and Kirgizstan and Tajikistan on the west. Hence the meaning of Xinjiang is 
“New Domain” and its size about Iran. Xinjiang’s importance comes from both natural resources 
of the region such as the oil and gas reserves, its geographic position at the same time. This new 
domain has been a gateway to Central Asia. First, for China, Xinjiang has a geographic 
importance. China’s transportation to the post-Soviet region takes place through this area and 
many nuclear facilities are located in this area. Furthermore, the rich agriculture in Xinjiang 
helps meet the needs of China.  
About seventeen million people (2013), numerically, the Kazakhs are relatively wide 
ethnic groups in Central Asia in terms of population. Kazakhs are followed by the Turks of 
Turkey, the Azerbaijani Turks, and the Uzbeks according to population. Kazakhs comprise a 
6 
quarter of the Turkic population in Central Asia. The total Kazakh population is estimated to be 
around 18,000,000: Kazakhstan is home to 16,909,800 (2013 OECD), China is home to 
1,420,000, the Mongolian People’s Republic is home to 120,000 (2013 The Mongolian Kazak 
Diaspora), Afghanistan is home to 50,000 (Cinarli, 2012:77), and Turkey is home to around 
10,000-15,000 of the total Kazakh population.  
The Kazakh ethnic history is very complex and stemming from Turkic and Mongolian 
tribes since Genghis Khan’s time. “The ethnonym Kazak (qazaq) began to be used during 1520s 
and 1530s” (Svanberg, 1989: 40) and their unity was become known as Kazakh Orda. “Kazakhs 
were nomadic people and their unification was under the name of three tribal federations, or 
Hordes, called Ulu Cuz (The Great Zhuz), which occupied regions south of the northern end of 
the Caspian Sea and the northern end of the Aral Sea; Orta Cuz (Middle Zhuz), between the 
Great Zhuz; and Kucuk Cuz (The Little Zhuz), between the northern end of the Caspian Sea and 
the northern end of the Aral Sea” (Hostler, 1993: 49). These three Zhuz covered the Urals and 
the Volga geographically. This Kazakh division ended with the victory of the Small Zhuz Khan, 
Bukey Khan in the 19th century until the Russian expansion.  
In China, the Kazakh ethnic minority dwells mainly in the Ili Kazak autonomous 
province, Barkol autonomous countries of Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region, and in Qinghai 
and Gansu provinces. For Xinjiang, the ethnic and demographic situation is a bit more complex. 
The Chinese Republic has been a country for people from many different languages, and 
religions. Different ethnic groups in the Xinjiang region are related to one another, although their 
culture unity is not as extensive as it is among Uighur, Kazakh and Kirgiz populations. The 
multi-ethnic population of Xinjiang is not a new phenomenon. During 1940s its population very 
intense, however the rest of China was more crowded. “Fourteen different nationalities were 
7 
present in Xinjiang, including: Uighurs, Kazakhs, Han and Hui Chinese, Taranchis, Kirgiz, 
Mongolians, Russians, Uzbeks, Sibos, Tajiks, Tatars, Solons, and Manchus. Many of these 
nationalities, particularly the Uighurs, Kazakhs, Taranchi, Russian, Uzbeks, and Tajiks arrived to 
the region from Central Asia, not China” (Laronde, 2008: 10-11). As a result, a melting pot was 
not case for Xinjiang since these different nationalities were not mixed. 
Kazakhs in Turkey 
 The majority of those Kazakhs who immigrated to Turkey merged and became 
permanent immigrants during 1950s. Almost two thousands permanent immigrants came to 
Turkey from East and Central Asia who were ethnically Turk such as Kazakhs, Uighurs and 
Kirgiz (Adatepe 1959: 194). These ethnically Turkic immigrants started their last journey in 
Bombay, continuing to Basra and Baghdad by sea way to Turkey then via train. They entered 
Turkey and food was provided after the formal processes of registration, identity preparation, 
and health inspection. 
 Those Kazakhs who came to Turkey during the winter of 1952-1954 were inserted in 
three different camps in Istanbul (Eren 1956 cited in Svanberg (1989:83). Their basic needs were 
met, and they received language courses. After their stay in the Istanbul camps, the Kazakhs 
moved to different cities such as Kayseri, Konya, Sakarya, Manisa and Nigde under control of 
Turkish Headship of Land Ministry. There were several families remained in Istanbul. In 
addition to new houses, the Kazakhs also received land. Those people also became Turkish 
citizens. Their number increased from 1,892 to around 15,000 since exodus days, (1952-1952) 
and this number also includes Kazakh who both emigrated from Kazakhstan and China since 
8 
1950s
5
. Moreover, this thesis is interested mainly in the ethnic identity of those Kazakh group 
who emigrated from China, Xinjiang. 
Thesis Outline 
 In order to provide a well-organized thesis, seven chapters were included. Chapter 1 
explains the Kazakh history. Moreover, Kazakhs’ historical past in Xinjiang, and Kazakhstan. In 
particular, their journey from Xinjiang to India, Pakistan, and Turkey were examined. I attempt 
to include detailed information about Xinjiang’s historical background in order to take into 
account how center and periphery relations affect identity formation, self-identification, and 
culture formation. Overall migration history and their socio-economic status of participants were 
presented. Furthermore, when exploring the Kazakhs in Turkey, population size, and ethnic-
cultural associations are some of the characteristics examined.  
 I need to see that if hybridization is helpful to explain what happened those Kazakhs to 
migrated to Turkey, did they retention their ethnic identity and form a new implications for 
ethnic identity. Chapter Three explains some definitions such identity, ethnic identity and the 
relations between gender, age and socio-economic status with ethnic identity retention. Then, it 
reviews existing literature on three dominant paradigms situating the relationship between 
culture and globalization: homogenization, polarization and hybridization. It also presents the 
map of research and aims to figure out how hybridization and culture influence the formation of 
ethnic identity and how this thesis explains it. 
                                                          
5
 Population of Kazakh is slighty increasing since 1990s. For example, according to Turkish Immigrant records, 
4,531 Kazakhs immigrated to Turkey (4,153 Kazakh from Kazakhstan and 378 Kazakhs from China) during 1995-
2000 (Subanova, 2013:53). 
9 
 The process and method of study is discussed in Chapter Four. Moreover, research size, 
participants’ selection, and data collection are also included. While Chapter Four stresses the 
study area, Turkey in detailed, the analysis techniques, limitations and ethnics explained. 
 The empirical findings presented in Chapter five. It also examines the participants’ 
demographic profiles and retention of Kazakh identity.  It gives some overview points from the 
survey: participants’ answers to survey questions. Furthermore, it shows the Kazakh ethnic 
identity retention through external and internal aspects focusing on participants’ responses. 
Speaking Kazakh Language, giving importance to ethnicity, attending ethnic organizations’ 
functions and media preferences are the six features for external aspect of ethnic identity 
retention, while affective, fiducial, cognitive and moral dimension were examined for internal 
aspect of ethnic identity retention. 
 Chapter Six emphasizes on self-identification of participants. It placed participants’ 
responses to open-ended questions in relation to the three dominant perspectives on cultural 
globalization: homogenization, polarization, and hybridization. Furthermore, it analyses the 
importance of Kazakh identity, and culture among participants. The chapter concludes by 
discussing participants’ reactions to Turkic identity and its relations with Kazak ethnic identity. 
 At the end, Chapter Seven concludes the study and summarizes the findings. In addition, 
direction for further research is stated in this chapter. 
       
 
 
 
10 
                                                                    CHAPTER 2 
                                         KAZAKHS: THE ROAD TO TURKEY 
 This chapter is intended to explain how Kazakhs finally arrived in Turkey. The following 
chapter begins with background information on the origin of Kazakhs, followed by a general 
historical knowledge about the Kazakh people from Kazakhstan to Xinjiang. In order to draw a 
big picture about Kazakh history, the relations with Russia and China are examined in this part. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with the Kazakh exodus to Turkey.   
Origin of the Kazakhs 
 This study is focused on Kazakh ethnic identity. Therefore, discussing the origin of the 
Kazakh people is a useful starting point. The nation of Kazakhs is formed in a hybrid fashion, 
with two distinct origins from both Turkic and Mongolian blood. Word meaning of Kazakh 
(Qazaq in Turkic and Qazzah in Persian) for some scholars is originally a free person as a 
wanderer, and brave person (Yigit, 2001:3). In time, it gradually gained social content through 
the emergence of a clan or a tribe
6
. As stressed by other scholars (Baipakov & Kumekov, 2003), 
the Kazakh history and formation of Kazakh identity does not concur at the same time. 
 In 1508-1509, Fazlullah bin Ruzbihan noted that Kazakhs were one of three groups of 
people among the Uzbeks: Shaybans, Kazakhs, and Manghits. More possibly, the three groups of 
people were actually tribes. “The first group was that of the Shaybans- a part of the Kipchak 
tribes or a lesser division of them under Muhammed Shaybani. The second were the Kazakhs, by 
                                                          
6
 The spelling of the Kazakh words for this study, I will follow a well-known form of the words. Deciding the form of 
world require more attention since sources in other languages have come across difficulties in translation. For 
example, Qazaq is more appropriate to pronounce in the Kazakh language for “Kazakhs,” which is more common in 
English. Most of the researchers are also using “Kazak” (Linda Benson, Godfrey Lias, etc. ) or “Qazaq”( researches  
in Kazakh literature).  Therefore, I will use the spelling “Kazakh” for Qazaq, or Kazak in order to catch up with 
modern literature, in which the spelling “Kazakh” is used more frequently.  
11 
which Fazlullah meant the subjects of the first Kazakh khans, who had wandered over the vast 
expanses between Itil (Volga) and the Syr Darya (Jaxartes). And the third were the Manghits, a 
group that included a part of the population of the Noghay Horde” (Baipakov & Kumekov, 2003: 
91).  
Kazakh ethnic identity was stemming from its Uzbek root; however it also gained a 
distinct identity. As a result, Uzbek-Kazakh division had appeared. The Kazakh people, in time, 
became an “ethnonym” - a name given an ethnic group- indicating a specific group of people 
belongs to Kazakhstan
7
. “The collapse of the Khanate of Moghulistan and the Noghay Horde- is 
a subgroup of the Kazakh people- led to an increase in scope of the ethnonym ‘Kazakh’ to the 
population of Semirechye (Jeti-su) and the western part of the eastern Dasht-I Qipchaq (Kipchak 
steppes). The people expressed their consciousness of this new ethnic unity in a shared heritage 
of epic tales” (Baipakov & Kumekov, 2003:91). Finally, the ethnonym ‘Kazakh’ was used 
nomadic groups who live in Kazakhstan region. 
The Kazakh nation came into existence in the fifteenth century. “The formation of a 
nation is a lengthy process and it is sometimes difficult to ascribe any precisely dated period to it. 
Even so, it is evident from an overall consideration of the historical, ethnographical, and 
linguistic materials that the formation of the Kazakh nationality had been largely completed by 
the close of the fifteenth century” (Baipakov & Kumekov, 2003:91). Moreover, the appearance 
of Kazakhs as an independent ethnic unit was observed under Kasam Khan (1511-1518). 
 
 
                                                          
7
Ethnonym is originally Greek word which means “a national group” and “name” and is the name that 
distinguishes peoples into groups as “we” and “you” (Mullen, Calogero, and Leader, 2007:612). 
12 
The Kazakh of Kazakhstan 
 Kazakhs have a very complex ethnic history with a well-known nomadic past in the 
steppes of Turkestan, and they were a part of nomadic culture which shared similar 
characteristics with Mongolians and Turks. As noted earlier, the world of “Kazakh” had been 
used for the specific group of Kazakhstan during 1520s and 1530s” (Svanberg, 1989: 40) and 
this century paved the way of semi-political formation. Kazakhs had been nomadic pastoralists 
during the 1500s. Their pastures were originally in the eastern part of the Chagatai region, along 
the Chu River with dependency to Uzbek Khan. During the 16
th
 centruy, the Kazakh Orda 
controlled the region of Chagatai. Moreover, other Turkic nomads joined this new Kazakh 
Khanate formation. During the 16
th
 century, “the term Kazakh, which had had until then a 
political federative significance, took on an ethnic meaning” (Krader, 1971:63). The Kazakhs 
ultimately gained a distinct ethnic identity which separated them from their Uzbek and Kirgiz 
roots.  
The Kazakh political confederation was also known as Kazak Orda. Over the last three 
decades of the sixteenth century, while its power was rising, the Monghul Khanate lost its 
strength over not only the Central Asia but Asia as a whole. However, Kazakh Orda was not able 
to survive as a unity, this did not take much time for the Kazakh Khanate to divide into the 3 
Zhuz systems which consisted of Uly Zhuz (Great Horde), Orta Horde (Middle Horde), and Kishi 
Zhuz (Little Horde). These three Zhuz had an impact on Kazakh ethnic identity formation. 
Although the time and mode of formation of these three Hordes were uncertain, their entities 
have shaped the power relations, ethnicity, and culture of Kazakh people. The nomadic life style 
of the Kazakh people declined the process of ethnicity shifted. In sum, the consolidation of their 
ethnic identity was accompanied with ethnic territory ties. “ Under conditions of a largely 
13 
nomadic way of life with extensive cattle-herding, the boundaries of the areas occupied by clans 
and tribes were not clearly defined, but they nevertheless became increasingly definite and 
comparatively stable in the course of ethnic integration” (Baipakov & Kumekov, 2003:93). For 
example, Kazakhs keep their family records with “shezhyre,” a genealogical family tree, which 
shows horde information and seven generations of their ancestry. These are used for living in one 
of the hordes and permission to marry. Knowledge of one’s own Horde still is an important for 
Kazakhs. The following map illustrates the location of Hordes: 
 
 
Figure 1. Kazakh Zhuzs
8
 
1. “The Great Horde, which occupied regions south of the northern end of the Caspian 
Sea and northern end of the Aral Sea; 
                                                          
8
 Source:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junior_j%C3%BCz (Zhuz, 2015). 
14 
2. The Little Horde, located between the northern end of the Caspian Sea and the end of 
the Aral Sea; 
3. The Middle Horde, positioned between the two other Hordes” (Hostler, 1993: 49). 
 These three hordes were collaterally organized according to seniority and the power 
relations among families. In the 17
th
 century, one century after the formation of the three hordes, 
Kazakhstan was still unable to unify the country under one powerful khan. “No stable economic 
and political ties could be formed between the Kazakh Zhuzs. The difficulties standing in the 
way of uniting the Kazakh lands into a stable centralized state may be attributed to the economic 
backwardness of the Kazakh Khanate and the predominance of a natural economy, marked by 
the decline of the towns in southern Kazakhstan” (Baipakov & Kumekov, 2003:97). In the mid-
eighteenth century, promoting the sense of belonging to the same Kazakh nation, the Great 
Horde was able to gain control over the Middle and Little Hordes. During this time, Kazakhs 
were also fighting with the Oirots (Kalmuks) --one of the Western Mongolian people who were 
powerful in present-day parts of Russia, Kazakhstan, Mongalia and China-- until it was defeated 
(Gurbuz, 2011).  
 In order to balance the Kalmuks and the Dzungar Khanate, the Kazakhs sought help from 
the Russians. Due to the Kazakhs’ military and political condition --the lack of unification owing 
to the Dzungar invasion through Dzungaria (historically northern Xinjiang, China) -- the only 
option was help from the Russians. The initial effort was to gain protection; however, the power 
relations did not lead to a desirable outcome for the Kazakhs. Thereafter, the leader of Little 
Horde entered the Russian Empire’ rule. He signed a deed agreement and by doing to this the 
three hordes accepting acquisition of domination of Tsarist Russia by supposing a protection deal 
(Baipakov & Kumekov, 2003:97).                 
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 The hordes were approaching Russia progressively. “Contacts between the Kazakhs and 
the Russians, which had started in the sixteenth century, grew steadily stronger and the Kazakhs 
found themselves drawn ever more firmly into the Russian orbit” (Akiner, 1986:288). The 
Middle Horde accepted this subjugation by Russia, following the steps of the Little Horde. They 
reached an agreement with Peter the Great (1696-1725), who tried to assimilate the Kazakh 
Khan by diplomatic and military means. In the course of events --strong Kalmuk attacks, the 
Dzungar wars, and rising Chinese pressure-- the Kazakh Khans of the Middle and Little Hordes 
accepted Russian protection by 1731. The Great Horde was the last to confirm the agreement that 
guaranteed it had been admitted into Russia. 
 The Tsarist government initiated new migration policies and land reforms. This new 
system restricted the movements of Kazakhs, who had lost their best and most fertile lands to 
non-Kazakhs. This situation triggered revolts and rebellions. Thus, the Pugachev Revolt from 
1773 to 1775 was a result of increased tax burdens on peasants, levied by Catherine the Great in 
order for Tsarist Russia to acquire western technology, fashion, and art (Bosin, 2009). This 
innovation required the active support at the Kazakhs, who felt they were becoming powerless in 
their homeland. One of the main reasons for this revolt was the mandatory conversion to 
Christianity towards Kazakhs (Ibid, 2275). Unfortunately, the revolts compelled the Tsarist 
governments to Little Horde and Middle Horde more stringently. New administrative regulations 
abolished the rule of Kazakh Khans and new administrative districts were governed by a leader 
approved by Russia.  
 While Russian dominance in the region was increasing, the Kazakh uprisings resulted in 
a famous revolt, Kenesari, which united among the three hordes, which agreed to rebel against 
the Russian state (1837-1847). Nevertheless, this rebellion failed because of a lack of 
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coordination among the hordes and rebels, which fought separately and remained unorganized 
fashion (Hostler, 1993: 50). The Kazakh territories lost their best fertile land in favor of the Slavs 
as a result of austere Russian policies. “The natives were dispossessed of their best pastures and 
their most fertile areas: the local Russian authorities, acting on behalf of St. Petersburg, 
periodically removed the Kazakhs to less arable areas, and the Slavs were then settled on the best 
land which continued into the twentieth century “(Hostler, 1993:50). 
 The first period of voluntary unification with Russia was strategic. Kazakh historians 
argue that the alliances aimed to acquire temporary aid from the Russians. After every revolt and 
defeat, new regulations were imposed. Encounters with Tsarist Russia concluded with the seizure 
of land and thus, colonization. By the late 19
th
 century, Russia dominated most of Central Asia. 
At the same time, the ethnic geography changed progressively. The ethnography of Kazakhstan 
was changed transporting the Russian and Germans into the land of Kazakhs, while Kazakh 
population was suppressed. The rapid modernization of Russia required cheap raw materials. 
Therefore Kazakhstan, wealthy in natural and agricultural resources, since Russia aimed to 
benefitted from those resources.  
 During 1860s and 1880s, Kazakhstan’s administrative structure was changed as a final 
step in colonizing Kazakh lands. A new province, “Oblast,” was organized with the new nobles. 
New military staff was assigned and former military staff was sent to Moscow. New general 
governors paved Russsification into society. In 1887-1888, Kazakhstan became a colony of 
Russia (Nurpeis, 2005:243). In 1919, after the Bolshevik Revolution, Kazakhstan was 
successfully invaded by the Soviet Union. Although a Kazakh national government, “Alash 
Orda,” was established, it was not able to survive due to the support of non-Kazakhs in 
Kazakhstan (Center, 1994). By the end of 1919, Soviet rule had been imposed. In January 1920, 
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the First Kazakh Soviet Conference decided to gather all Kazakhs under the same umbrella, 
namely Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. “As a result of the troubles and 
dissatisfaction of the Kazakhs under the new Soviet government, Moskow arranged in 1921 that 
all lands along the Irtysh River and a six-mile tract along the Cossack Presnogorkovskaya 
frontier in Almolinsk governship were restituted to the Kazakh owners. The lands confiscated by 
the Czarist government for the new Russian settlers and still unoccupied by the prospective 
newcomers were handed back to the nomads. The lands taken by the Orthodox convents or 
assigned for rent to Russian gentry were returned to the Kazakhs. In the province of Semirechye 
and in Syr-Darya Oblast all expropriation of lands by Russian colonists from overpopulated 
central and western regions to Kazakhstan was temporarily stopped” (Hostler, 1993:50).        
   On the other hand, after one year, this land reform was suspended. Some radical changes 
were made. These radical changes eliminated the Kazakh population. Among such changes were 
forced collectivization and land reform, which decreased that all the land was national property 
and did not allow private ownership (Andraiym et al, 2013). “The result was a disaster, almost 
genocide. Best estimates are that 4 million Kazakhs died in 1922-33, and that four-fifths of 
Kazakh livestock was slaughtered or starved. Grain yields also dropped, to about one half pre-
collectivization level, ensuring continuing famine throughout the 1930s. In this period the last of 
the nomads either starved to death or fled to China” (Olcott, 1993:7 cited in Center 1994:6).  
 The twenty century can be labeled the longest century for the Kazakhs. The termination 
of the power struggle between Lenin and Stalin was unfavorable for Kazakh intellectuals and 
leaders. After Stalin became the Soviet leader, he executed many Kazakhs who had supported 
Lenin. In addition, political positions were filled with non-Kazakhs. Russian rule reduced 
Kazakhs’ wealth gradually. During the period from1953 to 1964, the Virgin Lands project and 
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settlement of non-Kazakhs in the country created new ethnic problems for the Kazakh 
government.  
 The first Kazakh secretary of the Central committee, Dinmukhamed Kunayev, tried to 
shape Kazakh nationalism. Stalin died in 1953. Following his death, Brezhnev became Soviet 
head of the state. This provided more space for Kazakh nationalism; two-thirds of government 
was replaced by Kazakhs (Center, 1994:7). In December 1986, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev 
made an historical mistake by dismissing Kunayev, the ruler of Kazakhstan, and replacing him 
with Gennadiy Kolbin, a Russian leader. This allowed the Kazakh voice to rise, leading to its 
own rules and sovereignty. On December 17, 1986, a bloody revolt spread through Alma-Ata.  
 The dismissal of Kolbin from office ended the revolt, and the last leader of the 
Communist Party of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, took office in 1989. The history of 
Kazakh people can be explained not only by the Russian domination, but also by their Turkic 
origins. Kazakhs are “numerous Turkish people living principally within the Kazakh SSR” 
(Hostler, 1993:49). Years of Soviet domination left its mark on the Kazakh land.  
The 1979 census reported a count of 6,556,442 Kazakh in the Soviet Union; 907,582 
(1982 Census) in China; 100,000 to 150,000 (mid-1980 estimate) in the Mongolian People’s 
Republic; almost 21,000 (1978 estimate) in Afghanistan; 5,000 (late 1980s estimate) in Turkey; 
and some Kazakh live in other countries (Svanberg, 1989: 40). With eight million Kazakhs in the 
1980s and seventeen million in the 2010s, the Kazakhs became intense in the Central Asia 
ethnically, followed by the Turks, the Azerbaijani Turks, and Uzbeks. Kazakhs comprise a 
quarter of the Turkic population. The total Kazakh population is estimated to be around 
18,000,000: 16,909,800 (2013 OECD) in Kazakhstan; 120,000 (2013 The Mongolian Kazak 
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Diaspora) in the Mongolian People’s Republic; 50,000 (Cinarli, 2012:77) in Afghanistan; and 
10,000 to 15,000 in Turkey.   
Apart from being the country of ethnic Kazakhs, Kazakhstan is crucial for all Kazakhs 
who live outside of the homeland. It shapes the Kazakh ethnic identity via formal state policies. 
The capital city of Kazakhstan, Almaty, has great influence on construction of Kazakhness. 
Moreover, there are four eras for the steps of construction on Kazakh identity in independent 
Kazakhstan. The first was from 1986 to 1990. During this era, named glasnost, nation and 
ethnicity obtained importance in the formation of identity preferences of Kazakhs and caused 
social upheavals such as Nevada-Semipalatinsk in 1989 (Assyltayeva, et. al. 2012). In the second 
era from 1991 to 1993, the new identity replaced the “Soviet man”. The third era, from 1993 to 
1995, was characterized by the formation in Kazakhstan of a self-determined Kazakh nation. In 
this stage, there was a significant outflow of Russian-speaking population. More than 400,000 
Russophones left Kazakhstan in 1994 and almost 2 million have left since independence 
(Assyltayeva, et al. 2012:193). During the fourth era, after 1995, national identity formation has 
focused mainly on preserving a common culture and promotion of Kazakh ethnic identity. 
Moreover, the construction of civic identity is part of place in Almaty’s new agenda. 
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The Kazakh of Xinjiang  
                                           While I have ruled here (Otukan), I have become reconciled 
with the Chinese people. The Chinese people, who give in abundance 
gold, silver, and silk have always used ingratiating words and have at 
their disposal enervating riches. While ensnaring them with their 
ingratiating talk and enervating riches, they have drawn the far-
dwelling peoples nearer the themselves. But after settling down near 
them these have come to see their cunning. 
                                                    But by letting yourselves be snared by their ingratiating talk 
and enervating riches, many of you, Turkish folk, have gone to 
destruction. I did not forget how many Turks who had been deceived 
by such thing had died, how many had been forced under Chinese 
yoke. 
- A stone inscription, Orkhon Inscription by Bilge 
Kagan, an 8
th
 century A.D., a Turkic ruler in what 
is now Mongolia (Ross and Thomsen, 1990) 
 Xinjiang, or Chinese Turkistan (also called East Turkestan), is bordered by the 
Mongolian People’s Republic on the east, Russia on the north,  India and The Tibet Autonomous 
Region on the south, Afghanistan and the distributed territory of Kashmir on the southwest, 
Kazakhstan on the northwest, and Kirgizstan and Tajikistan on the west. This geopolitical 
location alone was enough to create multifaceted relations with Xinjiang, which is about the size 
of Iran. Xinjiang fell under the domination of China four times—around the first century B.C, in 
the first century A.D. and afterwards, in the fifth and six centuries A.D. Its final conquer was in 
1955. In addition, it experienced Soviet communist pressure and colonization. 
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Figure 2: Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region
9
 
 The historical past of Xinjiang has been overestimated. Despite the literature about the 
emergence of China’s Far West, there is little about the Turkic-Islamic nature of the region. In 
historical content, the revolts in Xinjiang were written in the frame of invasion of the region by 
Imperial China and its inhabitants and then Islamic source of local revolts. By the 17
th
 century, 
the Turkic side of revolts gained more attention while contemporary tension in Xinjiang is called 
Islamic terrorism or Islamic separatism
10
. On the other hand, the Turkic-Islamic nature of the 
region gained recognition from prominent scholars such as Linda Benson, Godfrey Lias, and 
Ingvar Svanberg. Fortunately, we can gain a broader view from some history book. The Tarik-I-
Rashidi of Mirza Muhammad Haidar, Dughlat,for example, a book about Mongalian history in 
Central Asia. The topic of this thesis is not about the actual owner of Xinjiang. Nevertheless, this 
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 The implication of the People’s Republic of China is ignoring a nationalist desire from Xinjiang and trying to 
reduce the speed of nationalist movement by degrading the problem to Islamic extremism.  
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book relates the contemporary problems of the region to those unsolved historical problems. A 
part from the book, its second chapter, “The Eastern Khanate, or Uighuristan”, draws a 
comprehensive conclusion about inner Central Asia, putting emphasis on how complex were 
historical relations in the region. After providing detailed information about the history of 
Central Asia and the Xinjiang region, it concludes that this region historically belonged to the 
Uighurs and other Turkic races (Elias and Ross, 1973:72-115). Mirza Haidar declares that 
 “with the gradual breakup of the power of the Moghuls towards the end of the 
sixteenth century, and the rise of the Manchu dynasty in China in the first half of the 
seventeenth, the Khanate of Uighuristan fell more and more under the influence of 
China. For a time, during the eighteenth century, the Kalmaks, with the help of the 
Tibetans, obtained a hold over it, but this was of short duration, and on their final 
subjugation by the Manchus, about 1755, the whole country became Chinese territory” 
(Elias and Ross, 1973:113-114).   
 Qing China was a colonizer that controlled East Turkestan, considering it as its inner 
province and disregarding its name ‘East Turkestan’ (Milward 2007). China was sought to 
convince East Turkestan to abandon its own territory. China also applied new policies of 
differentiation of peripheral lands, and promoting Han colonization (Jacobs, 2010)
11
.   
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 Han Chinese is the major ethnic group in China (92 %) and they also control over the Xinjiang for centuries. 
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Table 1: Xinjiang’s main historical events outlined in chronological order. 
1644 The Manchus invaded China and took control over the area that had been under 
the control of the Ming dynasty 
1863 Muslim Revolt in Kashgaria 
1865 Yakup Bek declared himself as the Khan of Kashgaria. He stayed at power until 
1870s, the Qing commaner Zhou Zungdan imploded his power. 
1870 Tsarist Russia occupied Ili valley 
1877 Kasgaria and Ili were recaptured by the Qing dynasty, and a peace treaty with 
Russia was signed in 1881 
1884 The Qing dynasty, the Manchu government took over Xinjiang as a regular 
province of the Chinese Empire 
1884 Xinjiang obtained its formal name 
1911 Chinese Revolution (The republican revolution), the end of the Qing dynasty 
1912 Yang Zengxin (Yang Tseng-hsin), a Kuominhang party member, became 
Xinjiang’s governor 
1928 Chin shujen (Jin Shuren) became the new governor 
1931 The Hami Rebellion 
1931 The Japanese occupied Manchuria 
1927 Yang Zengxin made some economic concessions to the Soviets, but he prevented 
Soviet Economic influence from developing into Soviet political Domination. 
1930s  Ma Zhongying, Durgan warlord 
1931 Jin Shuren had continued Yang Zengxian’s pattern of relations with the Soveit 
Union, rebuffing Nanjing’s attempt to take the Chinese consulates in Central 
Asia away from Xinjiang provincial control, concluding a new trade treaty with 
the Soviet Union. 
1932 Turfan Rebellion 
1933-1943 The USSR 
1933-4 Eastern Turkestan Republic (ETR) 
1934-1940s Sheng Shicai(Shen Shih-tsai), governor 
1940s Rebellion in Zungharia 
1944 Ili Rebellion 
1944 Eastern Turkestan Republic resulted from the three Districts Revolution 
  
  After the region of Xinjiang become a province of China some two thousand years ago, 
China tried to assert dominance over the region. In 1884, the Imperial Manchu government 
incorporated Xinjiang as a regular province of the Chinese Empire. As China’s biggest province, 
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its importance arose from both its natural resource and its geographic position. It contains huge 
deposits of oil, gas, and Chinese nuclear test facilities are located in Xinjiang. 
 Historically, Xinjiang is a pivot for not only China, but for Asia as a whole owing to its 
geopolitical importance. It also functioned as a “cultural buffer zone” against superpowers 
among different civilizations such as from Islamic civilization to Sinic, to Orthodox (Starr, 
2004:7). Arguments against the claims of Chinese officials that Xinjiang is an integral part of 
China, James Millward (2004) stressed that Xinjiang is the homeland of many people from 
Uigurs to Kazakhs to Kirgiz and many others. The Qing Imperial dynasty (1644-1911) was able 
to control Xinjiang in 1644 and ruled it as a hinterland of China. After 1644, the Qing dynasty 
dominated China and thereafter Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet (Dillon, 2004:17). 
Ethnic revolts 
 The revolts in Xinjiang were a part of the daily life in “the New Dominion.”  Almost 
every revolt from Xinjiang against the Chinese rulers resulted in their immigration towards the 
West in order to escape persecution. Neither the Empire nor Republican China was able to gain 
completely control over Xinjiang. In general, the main reason can be explained by the desire for 
religious freedom and nationalist movements against to the Manchu administration during the 
19
th
 century.   
 The Qing dynasty paid much attention to linking Xinjiang and China – hoping to 
integrate the systems economically and politically. The Ili valley was established as an 
administrative center in 1858. During the 1700s and 1800s, relations were relatively peaceful 
until Jahangir encroached upon Kashgar and drive out the Qing troop in1820. Seven years later, 
Chinese troops invaded the cities again, allowing the first “Han Chinese” to emigrate from China 
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to Xinjiang during the following years. At the same time, the Qing dynasty required control of 
Southern Xinjiang (Dillon, 2004:19).  
 The riots become a part of daily life in Xinjiang, while the Chinese progressively secured 
their position. At the beginning of 19
th
 century, several upheavals occurred caused by Islamic 
and nationalist groups (Svanberg, 1989:44). Not only were the non-Han Chinese in revolt but 
also Muslim Chinese: in 1862, a widespread revolt was involved by the Dungans
12
.  
 Studying Xinjiang history, it is difficult to comprehend why and where a given revolt 
broke out. However, the reasons that caused revolts seem simple as economical, religious and 
nationalist desires. High tax rate and forced labor fueled many of the revolts (Winje, 2007). 
Religion mattered and being against of Han Chinese domination too. In 1863, the Muslims 
rebelled in Kashgaria. Then, other Muslim groups also revolted and they also supported Yakub 
Bek, an influential local leader. Yakub Bek --was the commander of the Emir Khokand-- 
benefitted from this revolt and seized power. However, in 1865, Yakub Bek declared himself as 
Khan of Kashgaria and took the power of Jungaria for several years.  
  In 1870, the Russian forces entered the region. For a while, Russia acted as a commercial 
power. The colonization of Xinjiang was different than the colonization of Kazakhstan; in the 
sense that Tsarist Russia focused mainly on direct economic benefits. However, Tsarist Russia 
also aimed to humble the Manchu government to increase Russian influence in the east. Under 
General Kolpakofky, Russia occupied the Ili valley in July 1870. The Qing commander Zhou 
Zungdan was, however, able to gradually overcome the invaders. In 1877 Kashgaria was 
recaptured and four years later a new peace agreement between Russia and Xinjiang. Therefore, 
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they constituted 4.6 % of the present day Xinjiang population with the count of 2 million (Winje, 2007:9). 
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Russian left the Ili valley that made the territory part of China in 1884 (Svanberg, 1989:45). As a 
result, during 1870s, Zhou Zungdan eroded Yakub Beg’s power and expelled Russian forces. 
The region was regained from Russian’ forces and Yakup Bek committed suicide (Winje, 
2007:11). This in 1884, the new territory of China was named “Xinjiang” and became a formal 
province of China (Dillon, 2004:19).   
Xinjiang under Governor Yang Zengxin 
 The imperial tradition spread through Xinxiang until the Chinese Empire collapsed in 
1911. “During the reign of the Manchu, the West Mongolian Torguts were favored over the 
Kazakhs. The fundamental right to pastures was supposed to belong to the Mongols, while the 
different Kazakh tribes were seen as tenants of the Mongols” (Svanberg, 1989:46).  The 
Republican revolution transformed the Qing Empire to into a republic and a new ideology spread 
by Yang Zengxin. He became China’s governor in Xinjiang and was able to safeguard China’s 
interests
13
. However, Yang followed a different approach by isolating the heart of Asia from 
China proper and enforcing strict control over the region.  
 Revolts in Xinjiang were considered ‘incidents’ involuntary Chinese administrations, 
resulting from inadequate reforms and other recovery efforts. Kazakh rebellions were classified 
as incidents as well. According to Svanberg (1989), for instance governor Yang made effort to 
overcome a major Kazakh incident. When Russian Empire tried to use Russian Kazakhs as 
soldiers, the Russian Kazakhs revolted because those soldiers had been exempt from military 
service during the First World War. The revolt later diffused quickly to West Turkestan--Russian 
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Tseng-Hsin.’ 
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Turkestan. Russian forces was able to finish the revolt. Those Kazakhs were not able to stand 
firm against the Tsarist troops and Kazakhs escaped into Xinjiang.  
“The Number of refugees amounted, according to Yang (1961), to nearly 
300,000. Governer Yang was eager to get rid of them as soon as possible, both due to 
the problems of supporting these refugees and for security reasons. Through 
negotiations with Russians, Yang Zengxin managed to obtain a treaty of amnesty for 
the refugees, provided they returned home. Thanks to tactical and fast maneuvering, the 
last Kazak refugees had left Xinjiang by the autumn of 1918 (Yang 1961:306-308)” 
(Svanberg, 1989:46).  
These kinds of Kazakh ‘incidents’ were successfully managed by governor Zengxin. 
  The relations with Yang Zengxin and the Soviets depended on two-sided benefits. Both 
side needed other to take advantage of Xinjiang. Since Yang’ period concurs with the Soviet 
Russian invasion of Xinjiang in 1928, Yang had applied some soviet rules to eliminate direct 
intervention from Russia. On the one hand, the implications of Soviet rule increased the 
dissatisfaction among Kazakhs in Kazakhstan. For instance, in 1928, collectivization was applied 
in Soviet territory. “Collectivization led to conflicts and great difficulties for the Kazakhs there. 
Nomadic families saw their herds starving on pastures which no longer could sustain them; 
others slaughtered their herds and fled. Many Kazakhs escaped to Afghanistan, while others took 
flight into Xinjiang” (Dreyer 1977:152 cited in Svanberg:46). On the other hand, these 
newcomers increased the burden of Yang Zengxin. Many Nayman Kazakhs escaped through 
Xinjiang during those days. “The Nayman Kazakhs, who in the 1920s were nomads in Russian 
Altai, had been in Xinjiang 1870-1900, but after the turn of the century they had returned to the 
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Russian side. Now they again entered Xinjiang and received pastures in the province (Dreyer 
1972:152).” (Svanberg, 1989:46). However they understood how Yang Zengxin’ administration 
is similar to Soviet style with similar Soviet implications in Xinjiang. 
Xinjiang, the Republic of China, and the USSR 
 Yang Zengxin became governor after the 1912 Chinese Revolution. He was able to 
safeguard Chinese interests of Xinjiang while trying to keep the Chinese government at bay. He 
was a warlord and an autocratic official of the Manchu dynasty and his political purpose was to 
govern Xinjiang as his own territory. Yang Zengxin’s success methods depended on balancing 
the Chinese government and Soviet Russia. In order to eliminate Russian dominance in the 
region, Yang supported “Basmatchis movement” anti-Communist guerrillas who purposed to 
free Central Asia and eliminated Russian forces. Yang was jeopardizing Soviet interests. 
 Governor Yang Zengxin was assassinated in 1928. Jin Shuren
14
, who was pro-Soviet, 
became the representative of the Chinese government. During this period, the Chinese 
Kuomintang Party and the Soviet Communist party had an aliens. In 1931, a new trade 
agreement signed increased trade and the Russian presence in the Chinese Far East. After 1925, 
civil war in other provinces of China had resulted in complete Soviet dominance of trade with 
Xinjiang (Barber & Hanwell, 1939).  By 1933, the USSR controlled approximately 90 percent of 
trade with Xinjiang. And, with the fall of governor Chin Shu-Jen in 1933, all non-Soviet 
commercial groups were eliminated (Nyman & Nyman, 1991). By joining forces in Xinjiang, the 
White Russians, Manchurian troops, and regular Soviet forces helped overthrow the Tungan 
general Ma Chung-Ying. In sum, “following the assassination of Yang Zengxin, governor of the 
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 Jin Shuren (Winje, 2007)  is also written as Sheng Shih-tsai( in McLean,1948), or Chin Shu-jen (in Nyman 1991) 
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province for seventeen years, his successor concluded a trade agreement which conceded many 
privileges to the Soviet Union without the knowledge of the Chinese Central Government” 
(Barber and Hanwell, 1939:103).  
 In short, Soviet Russia benefited from those revolts during the early 1930s and extended 
its influence across Xinjiang. Later, Jin Shuren was elected as a new governor, but was facing 
with ongoing rebellions (McLean, 1948). Dissatisfaction was a natural part of daily political life 
in Xinjiang. Under the rule of Governor Sheng, a harsh and Soviet-oriented governor, 
dissatisfaction among populations became unbearable. Sheng treated Soviet advisers mercifully 
and Xinjiang become a province of the USSR (Lattimore, 1950). Strict Soviet education rules 
advanced compulsory mass education and European-style courts (Nyman & Nyman, 1991). New 
administrative regulations were put into practice that increased the economic dependence the 
Soviets. Hence, the 1931 economic treaty was extended.  
  During the period of 1930s, several rebellions had flared up against the Xinjiang 
government. Jin Shuren was unsuccessful. He could not maintain positive relations with 
Xinjiang’s ethnic groups and their leaders (Dillon, 2004:20). During a rebellion in 1931, the 
Gansu-based Durgan warlord Ma Zhongying provided support to local Muslims. Governor Jin 
appointed the Manchurian Sheng Shicai, who was supported by the Soviet Union, to suppress the 
revolt (Winje, 2007:12). Jin Shuren defeated the Muslim rebels under Soviet guidance. At the 
same time, he applied some reforms which were carried used Soviets slogans such as “anti-
imperialism,” “kinship to Sovietism,” and “racial equality.” Great effort was put forth to spread 
Marxist ideology.  However, there were new upheavals,  
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“ in the south of Xinjiang, the Uighurs, Kirghiz, Kazakhs and Hui revolted, and they 
soon had the whole area under their control. In February 1933 a provisional 
government was established for the Islamic Eastern Turkestan Republic. Even in the 
north of Xinjiang, people revolted against Governor Shen Shih-tsai. The Torgut 
Mongols joined after Jin had executed a leader of the Karashahr Torguts, Sechen 
Gegen Khan” (Svanberg, 1989:47).  
New rebellion resulted in dismissal of Governor Shen Shih-Tsai. However, his reassignment did 
not settle the population. They joined the rebels and rose up against the Han Chinese. 
 Shen Shih-Tsai (Sheng Shicai) also applied some Soviet policies. For example, advanced 
students were sent to Tashkent, whose education system was controlled by the USSR. While 
some modern cultural activities such as theater and cinema were encouraged, Shen Shih-Tsai’s 
oppressive rule focused on diminishing the power of Islam. Islamic worksip—mosques-- were 
closed or converted into clubs and theatres, Islamic religious teachers were publicly ridiculed and 
persecuted (McLean, 1948:381)
15
. This situation caused additional rebellions, leading to the 
appearance of a strong Turkish and Tungan alliance in 1937. However, rebellion was quieted by 
Soviet intervention. By the end of 1938, Muslim and Turkish leaders had been defeated.   
 The Chinese administration had obtained Soviet support to fight the rebels. Thus, Soviet 
Russia gained additional influence in Xinjiang. Russian and Chinese forces managed to end the 
revolts. Rebel leaders died in prisons, and several thousands of Kazakhs were sent to Gansu 
(Lias, 1956). Kazakh goods were burned down, and their livestock and goods taken. 
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 This new governor, Sheng Shica, changed Chinese policies. He tried to get support and 
work together with local leaders and preferred to have local representatives from each group in 
Xinjiang for administration. New implications were also applied: “for the first time people could 
also start schools where teaching was provided in their own language” (Svanberg, 1989: 48). 
Unfortunately, these reforms were unsuccessful and short-lived. Declining Soviet power in the 
region led Sheng Shica to close the Kuomintang government, which intensified political 
oppression over Xinjiang (Svanberg, 1989). In June 1943, a new revolt occurred among Kazakhs 
in Altai and the Chinese government tried to rid itself of Kazakhs and forced them to migrate 
into Mongolia.  
 Xinjiang was occupied by Soviet forces from 1933 to 1943
16
. Since Xinjiang was a 
region rich in mining, it was very attractive for Soviet Russia. The Stalinist wind spread 
throughout Xinjiang until Kuomintang regained region in 1943 (Nyman & Nyman, 1991).  
Overall, while a certain amount of communist propaganda spread in Xinjiang, Soviet Russia’s 
objective was mainly economic. The co-operation between Russia and China helped to eliminate 
revolts and preserve these two nations’ interests, however, in time, the Russian domination 
spread through whole Xinjiang (Whiting, 1953:1-6). It would seem that the Russians prioritized 
the trade agreement over constructing a Russian Administration in Xinjiang. Overall, as 
Lattimore (1930) stresses that there were no Russian actions intending to invade Xinjiang for 
Russia.  
 Overall, Soviet policy was not solely for economic profit. It had been exerting its 
influence over Xinjiang and strengthening its defenses against possible Japanese flanking 
movements, following Japan’s occupation of Manchuria (Barber & Hanwell, 1939:103). 
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 The first Russian invasion of Ili Valley, the biggest district of Xinjiang, was in 1870. 
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Therefore, Japanese occupation was prevented over Xinjiang, however Russian domination 
spread over the region. 
The Heart of Asia, Xinjiang and Ethnic Conflict  
 The ethnic situation in Xinjiang is complex as well as demographic. The period of 
Chinese Republic, people representing several categories of languages, religions, and identities 
made up a complex structure. Different ethnic groups in the Xinjiang region were linked with 
others, although the culture was not homogenous as it was in Uighur, Kazakh, and Kirgiz 
cultures. 
 There are Fourteen different nationalities in Xinjiang, including “Uyghur 2,988,528; 
Kazakh 438, 575; Han 222,401; Hui 99,607; Taranchi 79,296; Kirghiz 69,923; Mongolian 
59,686; Russian 19,392; Uzbek 10,224; Sibo 10,626; Tajik 8,210; Tatar 5, 614; Solon 2,506; and 
Manchu 762.19 Many of the nationalities represented, particularly the Uyghurs, Kazakhs, 
Taranchi, Russian, Uzbeks, and Tajiks all arrived to the region from central Asia, not China” 
(Laronde, 2008: 10-11). It is clear that 95 % of the Xinjiang population consisted of Uighurs, 
Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and Mongols. The Han Chinese, whose population was round 5 percent, has 
maintained their political hegemony.  
 As noted earlier, Xinjiang was not the “melting pot”. Despite ethnic divisions and 
variations in the region, the most common race is Turkic. Therefore, in this thesis, the term 
Turkic will be used to encompass Uighurs, Kazakhs, and Kirgizis in order to avoid repetition. 
Xinjiang’s insurrections arose from ideologies of Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism, and rising 
nationalism. After more than half a century of McLean’s Sinkiang, the Turkic-Muslim people of 
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Xinjiang still suffer from restrictive policies of China, regarding freedom of religion that fosters 
nationalism among the Xinjiang population as in the past. 
 As noted above, the destiny of the region changed when the Qing took over East 
Turkestan. However, this thesis will focus on the destiny of Kazakhs in Xinjiang. Xinjiang is 
more closely related to Central Asia, both culturally and geographically than to China (Benson, 
1990). It became a province of China in 1884. Xinjiang was a legendary wealthy region, and its 
resources attracted not only the Chinese, but also the Russians. Muslim Turks have been a 
majority for Xinjiang, particularly Uighurs. They were Sunni Muslims and were the largest 
group in Xinjiang. Speaking an Eastern Turkic language, they were skilled in agriculture and 
trade. The Kazakh population in Xinjiang was small. The nomad Kazakhs were primarily located 
in Jungaria, and in Altai which covers the pastoral needs of Kazakh. 
 After a long-period of Russian dominance, the Kazakhs of Kazakhstan had largely 
accepted the Soviet ideology, and Kazakhstan “ has assumed almost a mystical significance as 
the repository of traditional Kazakh values and culture, and the place where Kazakhs who have 
lost their language might visit to recover it” (Dillon, 2004:30). Thus, Kazakhs from Xinjiang 
preserved their Kazakh qualities. “The main grazing grounds of the Sinkiang Kazakhs are along 
the borders between Sinkiang and the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic and between Sinkiang 
and the Mongolian Republic. From the Tekes and Kunguz River in the Ili region they range 
northeastward to the Chuguchak region and then southeastward along the Mongolian Altai” 
(Lattimore, 1950:129). Thus, Xinjiang Kazakhs had ensured a cultural purity over Russified 
Kazakhstan.  
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Political and Administrative Structure of Xinjiang 
 Political diversity was the main factor that affected the Han Chinese administration of 
Xinjiang. “The officials endorsed intensified influx of Hans and provided assimilative Confusian 
education for segments of the Turkic population” (Winje, 2007:11). According to the Far Eastern 
Survey (1948), the Chinese administration in the heart of Asia, Xinjiang, had internal and 
external aspects. Internally, the Chinese imposed a new system of land taxes. They organized 
well-systemized revenues which doubled the local tax and tribute burden. Externally, the 
Chinese administration promoted conflicts of interest to prevent local unity against its Chinese 
rulers (Survey, 1948). The four-pieced currency system, for example, reflected Chinese policies 
among its regions: “In four regions there were four different currencies, a device which 
prevented concentration of remittances for political purposes. At different periods Turkish-
speaking Moslems were favored against Chinese-speaking Moslems, or Mongol nomads against 
Kazakh nomads; and such favoritism was reversed when it seemed expedient” (Survey, 
1948:57). 
The nomadism
17
 of the Kazakhs was influenced by Kazakh political and administrative 
structures. The khans seemed “often to have been temporary leaders during wars” 
(Svanberg, 1989:43). One of the reasons that prevented unification of the Kazakhs hordes 
also was an absence of a national leader. Xinjiang’s multiethnic structure supported the 
general principle of administration by the Chinese, whose strategy was to play one race 
against the other (Barber & Hanwell, 1939). “The fundamental rule of balancing one 
subject group against another, have grown out of their experience since the 
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 Nomadism was an important characteristic of being Kazakh. “The Kazakhs are pastoral nomads, herding sheep, 
goats, horned cattle, horses, and camels. Felt tents are used in the summer, but most Kazakhs live in mud huts in 
the winter or, in mountain country, in log cabins.” (Lattimore, 1950:129-130). 
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Mohammedan rebellion. On the other hand, the great decrease of population made 
prosperity easy for any man who was willing to work. …. Government was, in practice, 
left in the hands of headmen and minor officials drawn from the native population, the 
Chinese officials exercising little more than a general supervision….. Minor disturbances 
occurred at the time of the Chinese revolution, and a number of Manchus were 
massacred; but the province was quickly set in order by Yang Tseng Hsin, an official of 
the old administration, who installed himself as governor and, after his office had been 
confirmed from Peiping, remained in power until his murder in 1928” (Lattimore, 
1930:324-325).  
 Imperial China used to change the administrative system in order to dominate nomads. It 
was a policy of “divide and conquer”. The Chinese government divided nomads into 
administrative units and divided political power among tribal groups. This policy limited the 
integration of different groups and the solidarity among them was not possible. The Qing 
government promoted local loyalties and they appointed new local lords. These new appointed 
nomadic leaders were called as “Wang”. The creation of local loyalties provided safe borders for 
Imperial control. They served to establish adhere to tribal confederation with significant 
autonomy for the Kazakhs. The “Wangs” appointed by the Emperor had an official emblem. The 
Wangs had a special mission to promote the superiority of the Manchu. Wangs, the nomadic 
leaders received valuable gifts from the Emperor. In 1912, Xinjiang was controlled by new 
governor. Ten districts system were applied: Xinjiang was divided to ten regions. The governor 
was made responsible for each district in Xinjiang. Apart from dividing the Kazakhs into smaller 
groups, the Chinese governors consistently favored the Chinese population. Han Chinese was 
settled into these new districts. In addition, the Chinese were urban and commercial rather than 
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rural and agricultural like Kazakh nomads (Lattimore, 1930). They spread the idea that Kazakhs 
and other Turkic groups needed Chinese in order to modernize the society.   
Ili Rebellion, November 1944   
 In November 1944, the Kazakhs supported another revolt while Osman Batur was their 
leader. Not only Turkic Muslims revolted but also Russians in the Xinjiang revolted against the 
Chinese government. Thanks to this rebellion, the declaration of Islamic state. The new 
government tried to get rid of the Han Chinese out of East Turkestan and made the region free. 
On November 12, 1944, when the Muslim Turks of Xinjiang seized to control of the Ili valley, 
they declared an East Turkestan Republic. Owing to a lack of unity, and resource, the three 
districts of Altai, Ili, and Chugucback appeared. “Many Kazakhs outside Ili remained loyal to 
Chinese nationalist government. In April 1946 Osman Batur broke with the Ili rebels, as well as 
the great part of the Kerey Kazakhs. Quite a few Nayman Kazakhs, however, continued to 
support the rebellion” (Svanberg, 1989:49). Their independence lasted only until 1946. 
According to Benson (1990), a central problem was fostering Turkic nationalism. At the end of 
1994, a peace agreement was signed by Chinese and Muslim Turks. In addition, Osman Batur 
contacted and set new rules with the Kuomintang representative.  
We should keep in mind that the upheavals in Xinjiang in the 1940s could be considered 
in reference to a colonial and colonizer relationship. Moreover, the reason behind the revolts was 
mainly Islamic. The manifesto and declarations of the new East Turkestan Republic clearly show 
what the Kazakhs were seeking in Turkey. The purposes of the new East Turkestan Republic 
government were clearly stated by Linda Benson. From the declaration of the Turkestan Islam 
Government:  
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“The Turkestan Islam Government is organized: praise be to Allah for his manifold 
blessing! Allah be praised! The aid of Allah has given us the heroism to overthrow the 
government of the oppressor Chinese. But even if we have set ourselves free, can it be 
pleasing in the sight of our God if we only stand and watch while you, our brethren in 
religion… still bear the bloody grievance of subjection to the black politics of the 
oppressor Government of the savage Chinese? Certainly our God would not be satisfied. 
We will not throw down our arms until we have made you free from the five bloody 
fingers of the Chinese oppressors’ power, nor until the very roots of the Chinese 
oppressors’ government have dried and died away from the face of the earth of East 
Turkestan, which we have inherited as our native land from our fathers and our 
grandfathers” (Benson, 1990:45). 
 In a handbill circulated in the region in 1944-1945, a political platform of fourteen points 
was outlined, including the following (summarized) objectives by Benson (1990): 
1. “End Chinese rule. 
2. Establish equality for all nationalities. 
3. Organize a national political alliance representing all people in East Turkestan in 
numbers proportionate to their population. 
4. Place local government in local hands. 
5. Promote free cultural development in all groups and the use of local languages. 
6. Reestablish locally manned military units. 
7. Abolish Sheng Shica’s prison system. 
8. Free all those arrested under Sheng 
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9. Establish friendly relations with the USSR and resume trade, especially for cattle, 
wool, skins and grains. 
10. Reduce taxation. 
11. Establish religious freedom. 
12. Oppose immigration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang. 
13. Increase the amount of irrigated land. 
14. End all forced labor.” (pg: 45-46) 
Table 2: Xinjiang Population by Nationality,1945 
Xinjiang population by Nationality ,      1945   
 
Nationality                                                  Population 
 
                                          
 
 
Uighur 2,988,528 
Han Chinese    222,401 
Hui      99,607 
Kazak  
Mongolian                                                                                                                              
   438,575 
59,686 
Russian      19,392 
Uzbek      10,224 
Taranchi      79,296 
Tatar    
Tajik 
Kirghiz                                                                                   
Sibo 
Solon 
Manchu 
Total 
       5,614 
       8,210 
     69,923 
     10,626 
       2,506 
          762 
4,015,350 
 
 The Chinese government tried a strategic assault—a local person--appointed Mahsud 
Sabri as the new governor of Xinjiang in 1947. However, due to the dissatisfaction of the Ili 
rebels, Kuomintang party replaced Mahmud Sabri with Tatar Burhan Shahidi.  The Chinese 
government had a close relation with Burhan Shahidi (Svanberg, 1989:50).  After the Soviet 
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collapse, China decided to change its traditional policy. Moreover, Chinese administration aimed 
to make the province look less colonial (Jacobs, 2010: 1293). 
 Burhan could not able to gain local support from the provincial government, although the 
Kuomintang party influenced the members of the provincial government. The only way for 
Kazakh leaders was go into the mountains and gathered their forces. These forced had little 
success in fighting the Communist. However, the fight did not abandoned and it was continued 
for 3 years from 1947 to 1950. Moreover, “in July, the rebels were forced to retire to Qinghai. 
Soon, people realized that continuing the fight was useless and the majority decided to escape to 
India through Tibet. Only Osman Batur remained with a few thousand men and continued the 
struggle. He was, however, soon caught and was executed in Urumchi in April 1951” (Lias, 
1956). 
 
Figure 3: Mansur Teyci’s the map of Exodus  
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 When Burhan joined the Chinese Communist regime, the Uighurs Mohammed Emin 
Bugra, Uighur local leader in rebellions, and Isa Yusuf Bek escaped to India with 1,000 
Turkestanis.  
“The majority of them reached India in December 1949. Refugees continued to 
flow through Tibet into India. In the summer of 1950 the American anthropologist Fank 
Bessac, who had stayed the last winter among Osman’s Kazakhs in Xinjiang, came out. 
Kazakhs participating in the resistance against the Communist did not flee until the 
summer of 1950, when many of them joined a group of Kazakhs in Gaz Kol. Nearly 
15,000 Kazakhs are said to have tried to escape to India. During a dramatic flight of 
nearly 4,000 kilometers the Kazakhs rode over some of the most hazardous regions in the 
world, i.e. the Lop Nor-desert, the Taklimakan Desert, Tibet, and the Himalayas. Only 
350 individuals survived the nearly two year long flight. The rest had been dispersed, 
frozen or starved to death, imprisoned, or killed in battles” (Svanberg, 1989: 52). 
 After the Kazakhs reached the Indian border, they were not allowed to enter. The conflict 
among different countries made their life depend on the process of refuges. The Indian officials 
told the Kazakhs they would not be safe in India,  
““I cannot let you in” the officer in charge explained when they reached him, until 
“I receive permission to do so, as I have already said. But also we cannot protect you 
outside our own territory. Therefore it will be best for you to have wherewith to protect 
yourselves. Take your arms back, for you may need them this very day. Whether the 
warning was simply shrewd anticipation or the result of a good intelligence service 
cannot be stated, but the Communist actually did attack again within a few hours. The 
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battle which followed was fought within full view of the Indian frontier. It began with the 
capture of eleven Kazaks by the Communists who immediately cut off their heads. … 
This battle was the last. The Indian commander of the frontier post no longer needed to 
be convinced of what would happen to the Kazaks if their entry into Kashmir were 
further delayed. Eleven heads had been seen to fall from the bodies of bound prisoners 
under his very eyes. Indeed, the Kazaks say that the grisly scene was actually filmed by 
the Indians so that they could prove to others what the Communists had done. So the 
frontier was opened and the Kazaks who had survived the fighting with the Communists 
as Manass, Kukuluk, Kucheng, Barkul, Gezkul and along the weary way through Tibet, 
were safe at least, safety having been the last thing they thought about” (Lias, 1956:216). 
 After long period of revolts migration flows and deaths was the destiny of East Turkestan 
and its peoples. Some of those people were able to reach Turkey and their journey ended in 
Istanbul. “The first immigrant wave--about 2,000--won through to Kashmir and Turkey was the 
country for being new homes” (Lias, 1956:10). 
 In September 1941, refugee number reached 3,039 individuals with refugees’ cattle. 
These refugees were hold in a tent camp in Muaffer Abad more than ten months. And, after one 
year, British authorities help them to move a local village. “However, many of the weaker died 
there because of infectious diseases and the unaccustomed climate. It is said that fifteen to 
twenty Kazakhs died every day. The situation was not improved by their limited freedom of 
movement and by the lack of opportunity to work. The original 3,000 refugees were reduced to 
1,200 in a period of less than a year” (Svanberg, 1989:52).  
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 Saudi Arabia was the country some of religious Turkistani went, although there were 
some who migrated to the United States. In addition, some groups wanted to follow the Kazakhs 
in Pakistan to Turkey. “The first 200 left Kashmir in November and December 1952, while were 
allowed to travel some months later. In 1953 under the leadership of Qalig Bek Hakim the last 60 
Kazaks left Pakistan” (Svanberg, 1989:54). 
Migration to Turkey 
 The majority of those Kazakhs who immigrated to Turkey merged and became 
permanent immigrants between 1952 and 1954. Almost two thousands permanent immigrants 
came to Turkey from East and Central Asia who were ethnically Turk such as Kazakhs, Uighurs 
and Kirgiz (Adatepe 1959: 194). These ethnically Turkic immigrants started their last journey in 
Bombay, continuing to Basra and Baghdad by sea way to Turkey then via train. They entered 
Turkey and food was provided after the formal processes of registration, identity preparation, 
and health inspection. 
 Those Kazakhs who came to Turkey during the winter of 1952-1954 were inserted in 
three different camps in Istanbul (Eren 1956 cited in Svanberg (1989:83). Their basic needs were 
met, and they received language courses. After their stay in the Istanbul camps, the Kazakhs 
moved to different cities such as Kayseri, Konya, Sakarya, Manisa and Nigde under control of 
Turkish Headship of Land.  About ten families remained in Istanbul. In addition to new houses, 
the Kazakhs also received fields. 
 Figure 3 (in pg. 38) was drawn by Mansur Teyci, the son of Huseyin Teyci who helped 
decide the reason why Kazakhs could not stay in India or Pakistan. When I met Mansur Teyci, 
he told me that they migrated from “their fatherland to their motherland.” His statement 
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demonstrated that these Kazakhs were willing to embrace a Turkic identity and desired to unity 
with Turkic races that share a common historical and linguistic ties. 
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                                                                  CHAPTER 3 
                                             THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
  My study started when I decided to work on the influence of globalization on the identity 
of Kazakhs of Turkey. I focused on how hybrid identities were constructed in a globalized world. 
This chapter starts with a discussion of identity as a relatively dynamic phase of life in which 
immigrants create a special form of their own identity. Later, this chapter focuses on the 
theoretical framework of the thesis. Globalization in the form of hybridization is one of the 
factors that has impacted identity formation. Three prominent theories, homogenization, 
polarization, and hybridization are described.  
Identity 
 Who are we? As a human being, identity, a well-studied topic in the social sciences is 
both very complex and simple concept (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000).  Culture, ethnicity, and 
ethnic identity help answer the question ‘who am I?’ Identity can be defined as affiliation with a 
“particular group, ideology, religion, social role or career” (Nayer, 2014: 13 cited in Eberhardt, 
2006). Therefore, for this thesis, culture and ethnic identity were considered in terms of 
globalization, considered an enemy of cultural identities by scholars such as Shepardand & 
Hayduk (2002). They view globalization as Westernization or new Western Imperialism. On the 
other hand, globalization is also considered as a phenomenon which raises awareness of local 
culture. Nevertheless, globalized capitalism and cultural imperialism are burdens of 
globalization, which must be managed to. 
 In the literature, cultural identity is seen as to be a victim of globalization rather than its 
product. However, this assumption implies that identity is related to individuals and their 
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community’s geographic and cultural borders, which construct and manage the features of 
cultural identity. In this sense, cultural identity is not an indicator of cultural belonging, it is a 
product of local communities (Tomlinson, 2003). Moreover, identity is something people simply 
have because of their traditional residence that protects their identity and culture from the 
outsiders. Therefore, Tomlinson (2003) criticized this approach because he does not believe that 
identity is a fragile in the face of globalization. Tomlinson views culture as a strong feature, it 
also transforms the global culture. In this framework, McWorld has to adjust its rules and its 
menus in order to make more profit. Local identities pressure global actors and they affect the 
universal culture.  
 I assume that Kazakhs in Turkey created a new cultural and ethnic identity, which is not a 
product of assimilated fragile identities resulting from globalization, but is a new form of cultural 
identity, which carries its own values, preferences, and historical treasures from its past, while 
gaining new characteristics from the Turkic identity. They formed an identity as “Kazakh 
Turkish” which emphasizes a common ancestry between Kazakhs and Turks. Kazakhs obtained 
a comprehensive identity which can be explained by hybrid identity construction.  
 I focused mainly on ethnic identity retention and self-identification of Kazakhs by 
distinguishing cultural differences in order to see whether hybridization occurred in those two 
components of identity.  
 Since people have used ethnicity as their point of departure when asked their identity, this 
thesis focuses on ethnic identity retention for Kazakhs. We are aware of generalizing the 
attachment on importance of ethnicity is not totally fair since every individual put difference 
level of importance to ethnicity.  However, it also appears that immigrants have paid more 
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attention to their ethnic identities, especially after they integrated to the new environment in the 
host country. As Clark & Drinkwater (2010) found, the first generation usually spends time and 
effort to integrate into society. They have to deal with basic needs, so they ignore ethnic 
identities. After they are satisfied with their lives, identity becomes more apparent in their 
agenda. 
Ethnic Identity   
 Ethnic identity is an elusive and complex notion and someone can find very different 
definitions among different disciplines. It can be defined that individual placed himself/herself 
on ethnicity which could vary and the perception about a shared common origin and culture are 
the main parts of ethnic identity definition that carries some features from the past. Phinney 
(2004) studies on ethnic identity development and change. She defines ethnic identity as a 
process of becoming an adult. 
 Ethnic identity formation and acculturation are not completely divergent (Phinney, 1990). 
The relationship between ethnicity and ethnic identity could be a reason why ethnic identity 
formation and acculturation overlap. Ethnic identity stems from one’s belonging to a particular 
ethnic group, while ethnicity is defined in many different ways.  Four fundamental approaches 
are used defining ethnicity. They are “ethnicity in term of primordial phenomenon, 
epiphenomenon, situational phenomenon, a purely subjective phenomenon” (Isajiw, 1993:2). 
The primordial element of ethnicity is gained by birth. Although the other three definitions have 
been constructed to deal with the deficiencies of primordial theory, they help to explain how 
ethnic identity is formed. Thus, Hetcher (1978) focused on the labor of to two groups ‘the 
immigrant group’ as periphery and ‘host country’ main culture as center. In the periphery, 
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marginal jobs, such as agricultural work, are not guaranteed a high compensation unlike jobs at 
the center (Hechter, 1978).  Moreover, maintaining their own cultures are widely spread through 
the peripheral labor sector. 
 A unique definition of ethnicity is not possible, and its definition derived from common 
culture. Rational choice theory has used the situational approach, and assumes that ethnic 
identity is selected according to its benefits. In this approach, individuals are able to acquire 
ethnicity in some cases, but not in others. Ross (1992) stresses ethnic membership and its 
relations with political advantage; hence ethnicity can be a tool for pressuring the political elites 
for public goods and benefits (Ross, 1992 cited in Isajiw,1993:3). As rational creatures, 
individuals balance the ascription of ethnic identity and social situations. Isajiw (1992) points out 
that this instrumental theory makes it difficult to explain some aspects of ethnicity because only 
practical interests are sufficient to deal with one’s feelings and concept of identity.  
 The subjective approach presents ethnicity as “a product of social-psychological reality 
or a matter of perception of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in contradistinction to looking at it as something 
given, which exists objectively as it were ‘out there’ (Isajiw, 1993:3). Subjectivists do not 
completely reject the objective side of ethnicity. They focus mainly on the objective side of 
ethnicity as dependent on socio-psychological experiences. Thus, culture and ethnic identity are 
distinguished from each by Barth (1969). Barth pioneered new psychological path to ethnic 
groups. Moreover, ethnicity and ethnic culture are not necessarily the same. Another subjective 
approach to ethnicity is constructionism in which ethnicity is a product of the process by 
negotiating and constructing with everyday living activities (Isajiw, 1993:4). Immigrants’ 
behavior and their perceptions of ethnicity, ethnic identity, and culture help understand how 
these concepts are related and to each other. 
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  Isajiw (1993:5) argues that “ethnicity is an abstract concept which includes an implicit 
reference to both collective and individual aspects of phenomenon.” He advises researchers to 
include at least some factors from both of these dimensions in order to measure ethnicity. 
Ethnicity has objective dimensions such as kinship and descent. It also has subjective dimensions 
such as attitudes, values, and preconceptions, the contents of which can be understand in the 
process of communication (Isajiw, 1993:5). Hence, ethnic identity emerges when an individual 
internalizes ethnicity. Ethnicity requires a perception about “common origin or at least a 
perceived common origin” and a practice for a common culture. While culture is a crucial 
element of ethnicity, it is not the same as ethnicity. It can be defined as “an essence a system of 
encoding such experience into a set of symbolic patterns” (Isajiw, 1993:5). Therefore, culture is 
one of  primary part of ethnic identity. They are not mutually exclusive. In addition, ethnic 
boundaries form a culture by transforming and creating the meaning of life, its content, and its 
norms. Most importantly, it distinguishes groups. At the same time, “culture contributes to the 
demarcation of group boundaries which psychologically (and frequently also in the real world) 
separate those who share these cultural features from those who are perceived as not 
participating in them” (Ferdman & Horenczyk, 2000:83). It is fair to say that culture is not totally 
static or fixed. It is a continuous state of transformation, which can be seen at different levels for 
different groups, whether it the results from power relations as center and periphery or from the 
level of social and economic development. “Elements of culture – its signals and symbols- may 
be transformed or filled with new meanings and take on new functions and expressions during 
intra-and intergroup contact (Lienkind, 1992).”(Ferdman & Horenczyk, 2000: 84). 
 According to Nagel (1994), socially constructed ethnicity, ethnic cultures, ethnic 
boundaries, and identities are results of interactions between different groups. Moreover, the 
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social interaction created, negotiated, and defined the ethnic identity too
18
. When new ethnic 
group identities are constructed and their self-identification, the new form appears from distinct 
identities such as “Lationo” or “Asian-American” (Yancey, Ericksen, & Juliani, 1976), and the 
fluid side of culture and ethnicity become apparent. 
 We must also note that individual constructions or representations of culture can alter 
within groups. Although culture is meaningful only with reference to the group, it is enacted by 
individuals (Ferdman, 1995). Group identity and individual identity can vary.   
 The construction of life in pluralistic societies is effected by pressure from mainstream 
culture to the periphery that provides to have some adaptable aspects of all ethnicities. There are 
two processes of ethnic identity formation: deconstruction and reconstruction. Deconstruction 
comprises some objective aspects “losing their meaning and use, while others lose their meaning 
without being completely dropped or for others still, the meaning may become latent” (Isajiw, 
1993:16). Reconstruction includes some objectives of ethnicity, which provide a new meaning to 
ethnic identity. It depends on ascribing and creating a new form that retains earlier elements.  
 Ethnic identity retention is very important. Isajiw’s (1990) approach to ethnic identity 
retention and his method were used in this thesis. According to Isajiw (1990:36; 1999: 416) 
ethnic identity includes two aspects: internal and external.   
“Locating oneself in relation to a community and society is not only a physiological 
phenomenon, but also a social phenomenon in the sense that the internal psychological 
states express themselves objectively in external behavior patterns that come to be shared 
by others. Thus, individuals locate themselves in one or another community internally by 
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 These processes of reconstruction, creation, and recreation of culture are eloquently described by Nagel (1994). 
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states of mind and feelings, such as self-definitions or feelings of closeness, and 
externally by behavior appropriate to these states of mind and feelings” (Isajiw W. , 
1990:35-36).  
We can gain detailed information about its external aspects by observing behavior: 
1) “Speaking a particular language; 
2) Practicing ethnic traditions: 
3) Participating in ethnic personal networks, such as family and friendship; 
4) Involvement in ethnic institutions like schools, enterprises, and media; 
5) Participating in ethnic voluntary organizations; and 
6) Participating in functions sponsored by ethnic organizations such as picnics, concerts, 
and dances” (Isajiw,1990:36). 
 The internal aspects of ethnic identity include attitudes, feelings, and attachment to 
groups. These can be grouped in align four dimensions: affective, fiducial, cognitive, and moral 
(Chiu, 2003). The affective dimension consists of feelings of attachment to groups with two 
special types of feelings. The first emphasizes one’s groups more than other groups, and the 
second encompasses feelings of comfort within one is group. The fiducial dimension of ethnic 
identity includes trust in one’s own ethnic group. The cognitive dimension refers to self-images, 
knowledge about the group’s values, history, and heritage. Lastly, the moral dimension refers to 
feeling to force someone to care because of ethnicity or to marry within the ethnic community, 
thus giving special attention to the retention of one’ native language (Isajiw W., 1990:36).  
  It is well studied that different generations act in a particular manner for ethnicity and 
ethnic identities. The Hansen hypothesis can summarize the general view point for ethnic 
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identity retention among generations (Isajiw, 1981:6). According to this, the first generation is 
more willing to stress its ethnic identity, and ethnic identity retention is relatively high for first 
generation. However, the second generation gives relatively less important to their ethnicity or 
rebels against its ethnic group; low ethnic identity retention. Furthermore, the third generation 
turns to ethnic identity and spent effort to know more about their ethnicity. Isajiw (1990) also 
states that the retention of ethnic identity among generations can result in different outcomes. He 
stresses that in comparing the second and third generations with the first, the latter tends to 
emphasize identity retention much more. Considering the differentiation among generations 
makes easy to have insight information for research on process of embracing new ethnic identity 
construction and retention of old ethnic identity (Eberhardt, 2006:55). 
 Apart from these, the homogenization of ethnic groups poses a significant problem. Since 
ethnic identities are still considered as culture, and there is no much attention to realize how they 
are internally contested and how the multiple layers of culture exist. (Nagel 2001: 252). This 
helps us understand hybridized transnational migrants. 
 Transnationalism
19
 helps explain how the immigration fosters formation of hybrid 
identities. In addition, the position of the nation, and cultural narratives included to 
transnationalism process (Mitchell, 2003). The host country influences immigrants’ identity 
formation. Its policies, formal ideologies, and its government’s frames form the attitudes and 
behaviors of both the native population and its immigrants. Culture, locality, and ethnicity are no 
longer neatly contained but are instead unbound by circulation of people, commodities, capital, 
images, and ideas (Nagel C. , 2001) . The definition transnationalism stresses that two or more 
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“Transnationalism emphasizes the multiple (social, cultural, economic, and political) ties and multi-scalar 
networks that migrants and displaced groups maintain across the borders of two or more nations-usually between 
the homeland and the country of settlement” (Veronis, 2006:12). 
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nations become a part of a new structure with specific social, political, and economic conditions 
at the local and global level (Guarnizo & Smith, 1998). This point paves the way of study for two 
reasons. Members of the Kazakh community in Turkey were become a part of transnationalism 
process from their homelands to a new host county, to Turkey. These Kazakhs brings with itself 
some critical components in the construction of hybrid identity formation, named Kazakh-
Turkish or “Kazak Turku.” This is different the term like an African-American, which does not 
assume a shared race link
20
. Subsequently, this results in a hybrid formation of a group identity 
in dual way: Turkish Kazakh and Kazakh Turk (for example, Turkiye Kazagi).  
 Therefore, the cross-border relations among these sub-groups help us understand the 
structure of the Kazakh community in Turkey and how their identity is deconstructed, 
negotiated, and reconstructed. What we need to pay more attention is that the three sided 
realtions: the Kazakh self-identification for sub-group identity, religionist identity and a hybrid 
identity. The boundaries has changed by moving a different country which influence these three 
sided ethnic identity. 
 The integration of immigrants to host countries has been intensively studied in the social 
sciences in recent decades. Ethnic identity of immigrants and its various demographic 
characteristics require further examination. 
Ethnic identity, identity and gender 
 In literature, there are some studies that show a different attachment towards ethnicity 
according to gender (Wilford, 1998). Particularly, women haves a special mission to protect 
ethnic values and contribute to ethnic and national processes. First, women are biologically 
                                                          
20
 Kazakh Turku does not just mean a Kazakh who live in Turkey it also covers ethnically common ancestry. 
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carries and forms the community's future generations and as key actors in the transmission of the 
community's values (Wilford, 1998). Grandmothers have a special mission to reproduce ethnic 
identity through family stories, and women tend to further ethnic rituals and traditional foods that 
fill the gap between past and future (Langellier, 2002). Women, for example, are more likely to 
preserve ethnic identity and there are some empirical evidences for this view: Ting-Tooney’s 
(1981) research reveals that Chinese-American female college students are more receptive 
toward ancestral culture than male student (cited in Chiu, 2003:46). 
Phinney (1990), on the other hand, argues there is no relationship between gender and 
ethnic identity. Phinney et al. is (2000) a study of 471 immigrant families of Armenian, Mexican, 
and Vietnamese immigrants in the United States that showed  gender had no impact on ethnicity. 
Ethnic identity, identity and socio-economic status (SES) 
 According to Crimmins et al. (2004), socioeconomic status (SES) helps us to understand 
that individuals’ position in the social structure. SES is mainly about financial well-being and 
educational attachment. It is measured by looking at education, occupation, income level, and 
wealth. Furthermore, Phinney et al.’s (2000) research also revealed that there we cannot reach a 
ties between socio-economic status and ethnic identity. In Phiney (2000)’s study, 471 immigrant 
and 230 non-immigrant groups were interviewed. The findings showed that an affiliation 
between SES and ethnicity exists for Mexican families, but not for Armenian and Vietnamese 
families. 
Ethnic identity, identity and age 
 The controversy between the view that adolescents are more global than their other 
family members and the conservativeness of first generation immigrants has attracted scholars 
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(Zimmerman, 2006). It appears that young generations embrace the practices of their host 
country. By doing this, they create a hybrid form, although the older generation preserves its 
distinct ethnic identity. The theory is that adolescents are a group which is forms multicultural 
identities and “they grow up knowing diverse cultural beliefs and behaviors” (Jensen, 2003). 
Phinney (2000) found a gap between adolescents and their parents among Armenian and 
Vietnamese immigrants, while Mexican immigrants’ ethnic identity retention did not vary among 
generations. Furthermore, Clark & Drinkwater (2010) found that the first generation makes an 
effort to integrate into society and has to deal with basic needs. Therefore they tend to ignore to 
ethnic identities. In time, after life satisfaction occurrs, identity became a part of their agenda.   
Homogenization Theory 
Across different countries, cities or regions in the world, people prefer to wear similar 
clothes, watch similar TV shows or listen to the same singers. Similarities among people who do 
not even know the name of each other’s country are becoming more visible day by day. Cultural 
practices and some common values such as human rights and democracy paved the way of 
“Global culture”. If we consider the argument that stresses the consequences of cultural 
globalization, we need to clarify how and to what extent globalization has an influence on the 
cultural landscape of distant localities. “Globalization and culture probably that is of 
convergence toward a common set of cultural traits and practice” (Holten, 2000:142). By the 
same token, the world becoming more homogenous owing to capitalism, and also cultural 
influences from the West, particularly the United States (Ritzer 1993 and Barber 1995).  
The homogenization theory is reflects a widespread view of cultural globalization. It 
emphasizes increasing similarities among different cultures due to the globalization processes. 
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Shopping malls or hotels look much the same whether they are in Singapore, St. Louis, or Sao 
Paula (Holton, 2000: 142). The homogenization thesis, whether it was labeled Westernization or 
Americanization, has been driven by the integration of international companies into local 
economies. In a similar manner, McDonaldization or Coca Colazation of the world is a result of 
the global economy. The decreasing power of nation states in the battle with global has formed a 
“McWorld” (Barber, 1995).  Global culture has its origins in the global economy, which is led by 
the Western cultures. While homogenization is also considered as the equivalent of 
Westernization or even Americanization, the new world also a product of the West. Thus, the 
worldwide economic market has changed the world order by multinational cooperation, 
companies, and formal institutions. In the name of trade, technological improvements, 
development of information technologies, communication and human rights, the world seems to 
have adopted Western values.  
Consumer capitalism helps spread Western products and services. There are new global 
products, innovative improvements, and systems transforming the world. On one side, 
Hollywood, for instance, is a cultural industry that furthers the imaginary power of the West. The 
recent development of information technologies and global communications has created new 
spaces for homogenization. It has been spread across the world by Microsoft, Google, Apple and 
Amazon. The internet has a special importance for homogenization since cyber users have 
become cyber citizens. On the other side, restaurant chains have created common tastes and 
Western and non-Western citizens. Rules that are creating McWorld’s standardized products and 
management have created a common system within different countries. 
New systems that ensure to common sense among different nations, states or 
organizations involve new management processes. For instance, Mc Donald’s franchise system 
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and its efficiency, and predictability exemplify global standardization. Mc Donald’s franchise 
system has successfully spread throughout the world, exemplifying the bureaucracy in Weber’s 
modernism (Ritzer, 2000: 99). As Max Weber work on formal rationality theory revealed the 
formal rational systems will dominate the world. As a result, McDonaldization paradigm is not 
only about the fast food trade. It has influenced social structure and institutions all over the 
world. 
Another dimension of the issue of homogeneity is the integration of elites from around 
the world in the educational, economic, and political life of Western societies (Holton, 2000: 
143). Globalization also produces a social class who has more similarities (Ritzer, 2010). 
Globalization reduces the barriers of geography and cultural differences. Moreover, it creates 
new cultural dimensions. The interconnection between countries and cultures creates cultural 
resistance in Europe and Japan, as well as non-Western countries and hybrid cultural forms. 
Cultural globalization is not a one-directional or one-way flow of information from the West. As 
Cohen (2007) states, there are multiple centers of cultural influence which are able to effect the 
world on a global scale. Brazilian media and Bollywood demonstrate this (Oztekin & Arioz, 
2014).   
Polarization Theory 
The limits in cultural homogenization seem to support polarization. A scholar such as 
Appadurai (1996) denies that the West is the only actor of globalization and Featherstone (1995) 
also states that the universal culture does not mean a Western culture (Hassi & Storti, 2012: 7). 
Polarization, also called heterogenization and differentiation, relates describe to barriers that 
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prevent flows that would make local cultures similar (Ritzer, 2010). Indeed, the movement of 
local cultures across boundaries makes those local cultures part of globalization.  
Heterogenization like homogenization, underestimates the fact that globalization is a 
process of transformation. Goods, technologies, ideas, values, and individuals flow to different 
directions. While globalization does not fully able to change non-western cultures, it influence 
some of their characteristics. In time, different cultural groups create separate entities that 
become diversified and different.  
We must mention Benjamin Barber’s book, Jihad vs. Mc World. Barber explains how 
globalization fosters two different processes, which operate in opposite directions but that are 
closely related. Although “Mc World” seems to intensify globalization, by expanding capitalism 
and dominating all aspects of social life, “Jihad”, which reflects the resistance to Mc World, 
protects and revitalizes traditional identities. “Mc World” is harmful to local culture until it 
raises “Jihad” awareness protects local identity with a particular group whether national, ethnic, 
or religious (Barber B. R., 1995).  
According to Samuel Huntington (1993), polarization approach claims that the world in a 
dichotomous way which is creating a different kind of civilizations. A civilization is “the highest 
cultural grouping of people and people in the broadest level of cultural identity has short of that 
which distinguishes humans from other species” (Huntington, 1993:24). Conflict--stemming 
from culture-- in the modern world will push different civilizations into war. Nations, 
communities, or groups will find themselves parts of broader cultural entities, “civilizations”,   
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Even if homogenization and polarization theories are useful to a certain extent, they do 
not answer how intercultural exchange and diverse culture from a range of sources merge into a 
primary cultural identity or practice (Oztekin & Arioz, 2014).  
Hybridization Theory 
Cultural hybridization is a relatively neglected approach to globalization. Hybridization is 
different than but is related to integration in which interdependencies develop while they 
preserve some features from its previous form (Dear & Burried, 2005). As Cancline (2003: 279) 
states, since the 1980s, the term “hybridity” has encompassed “all the processes that combine 
discrete social structure or practices, which already exist in distinctly separate forms, to create 
new structures, objects and practices in which the antecedents merge” (cited in Dear and Burried, 
2005:302). The term “hybrid” is derived from biological and botanical origins. In Latin, it meant 
the offspring of a tame sow and a wild boar. Hybridity, according to Robert J.C. Young (1950), 
was used to denote the crossing of people of different races for 1950s (cited in Ackermann, 
2012:6). 
Cultural hybridization emphasizes that homogenization and polarization theories need to 
pay attention to both fragmentation and unification, simultaneously reinforcing a consciousness 
of cultural difference as well as common identity. In addition, intercultural relations and 
incorporation of diverse cultures require a more comprehensive approach like hybridization. 
After two different cultures meet, individuals first select particular elements, practices, and 
values from the new culture. Then they replace or mix those with their old cultural heritage. A 
new form of cultural experience soon appears. These newly created features of culture reflect a 
new form, name hybridization. In sum, the homogenization approach claims that cultural 
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globalization stems from the West and the polarization theory suggests the cultural or 
civilizational boundaries, but neither explains the formation of a new culture.  
On the other hand, some cultural norms could not always able to find a space in new 
cultural hybridization. Since hybridization focuses on how a new features could embrace new 
components with previous one, the some prominent features of cultural attributes can be found 
after the integration of new culture. Moreover, immigrants tend to crate and combine their 
identity with host country’s identity. (Dear & Burried, 2005: 303). Some important components 
of cultural attributes can survive even after new attributes have been acquired. 
The process of modernization process led to standardization in different areas of life, 
although culture seems relatively preserved during the process. Improvements in technology, 
trade and communication that constitute modernity are linked with globalization. The most cited 
metaphor for globalization is that the world is becoming a small village with more uniform, 
standardized and westernized societies. This perspective views globalization as Westernization. 
These two are interrelated aspects of globalization-- the world is becoming more uniform and 
standardized thanks to technological, commercial, and cultural synchronization emanating from 
the West and is “a product of Westernization could be interpreted as  globalization as a process 
of hybridization which give rise to a global mélange” (Pieterse, 1995:45). 
Cultural globalization, or hybridization, means the blurred relationships among cultures. 
The cross-cultural relations between different cultures when they interact and select particular 
points from each other, and then reinterpret the new particular side which is a product of both 
different cultures (Cohen, 2007:2). In respect to this, multiple directions of cultural flows are the 
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main characteristic side of universal culture. Cultural convergence cannot be reduced as Western 
and American values. 
Modernity helped create a global society. The modernization process has fostered similar 
commercial, political, technological, scientific and cultural systems within this global society. 
The number of countries that are a part of this global society is increasing. Besides the 
globalization of trade and technology, cultural areas seem relatively more insulted. “While 
homogenization and polarization theories view culture in a territorial context as a localized 
learning process i.e., the culture of a society or a particular social group, hybridization thesis 
claims culture in a wider context as general human software (trans-local learning process) that 
cannot be confined to certain territory, ethnic or national entity” (Pieterse,1994:177).  
Research Questions 
 The primary goal of this study is to explore Kazakh identity in Turkey and Kazakh 
cultural experiences. As such, I have three research questions: 
1) How do Kazakhs negotiate among bilingual and bicultural identities? In particular, how 
do the Kazakhs in Turkey negotiate their ethnic identity with Turkish ethnic identity?   
2) What are the main forces that shape Kazakh identity? 
3) Which of the three approaches --Homogenization, Polarization and Hybridization—best 
explains the Kazakh community in Turkey? 
 As a result, I apply Isajiw (1990) offers in order to take into account the power of 
language and culture. In addition, I am interested in the language and culture of Kazakhs. Some 
definitions also described such as identity, ethnic identity, and hybridity as components of 
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culture. In addition, I apply Isajiw’s methods to measure ethnic identity formation as the 
methodology and research design for this study.  
Multiple/ Hybrid Ethnic Identities 
  Inter-ethnic marriages and migration were used as main indicator for multiple ethnic 
identities and they foster self-identification of individuals too. Turkey has been very welcome to 
many ethnic groups and has been a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural country. It is home to almost 
50 different Muslim and non-Muslim ethnic groups such as Sunni-Turks, Alevi-Turks, Suni-
Kurds, Alevi-Kurds, Circassians, Armenians, Georgians, Jews, Greeks, Arabs and Assrians 
(Andrews, 1992). The encouragement of a diverse culturally-ethnic society, however, did not 
remain on modern Turkey’s agenda because the nationalist discourse raised fears of separatist 
waves. The new republic tried to construct a Turkic notion which basically assumed all ethnic 
identities are part of Turkic nation. However, hyphenated identities are also seen in Turkey, since 
the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural past and present experiences were created by multi-ethnic 
marriages and immigration. Hence, cultural diversity helps to hyphenate the society, while 
immigrants and ethnic minorities are more likely to have hyphenated identities than the country’s 
majority (James (1999) cited in Chiu, 2003:49).  
Research on Kazakh Identity 
 When Kazakhstan became an independent country, the ethnic Kazakh identity formation 
was supported by state policies. The main characteristic of new state-centered Kazakh ethnicity 
was construction Kazakhstan as all Kazakhs’ homeland in terms of history and nation. The 
territorial assertion of Kazakh identity with Kazakh “yurd” was applied and the return 
immigrants to the homeland have been encouraged by several state policies. The repatriation in 
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“Kazakh Oralman,21” was implemented as state policy in order to increase the Kazakh 
population which had been severely dispersed during the Soviet regime.  
 The challenges of globalization, identity, and nation can be seen in two contexts for 
Kazakhstan. First, the desire to catch up with a new global order, international technology and 
economic system made learning English a priority for Nursultan Nazarbayev. He planned to 
promote the study of the Kazakh language, Russian, and English. His plan was to develop a 
country with a 20% English-speaking population by 2020 (Turumbetova, Tayeva, & 
N.Y.Grebenshikova, 2010:3). This trilingual society could foster the transformation process. 
Second, Kazakhstan pursued the ethno-nationalist nation-building policies during 1990s and then 
turned a civic-multiethnic nation building model. However, this new model retained some 
characteristics of the ethno-centric model such as making Kazakh traditional narratives and 
historical cultural roots mandatory subjects in learning the Kazakh language. Moreover, the 
massive outmigration of non-Kazakhs during the1990s created new problems, for instance the 
loss of skilled labor including managers and technicians. Kazakhstan’s solution was to create a 
new kind of super national identity like the “Soviet Man.” To encourage, (re)ethnicification with 
non-Kazakh minorities, Nazarbayev initiated “Eurasianism.” This provided two benefits. First, 
the idea of a Kazakh identity was developed to soften ethno-centric nation building policies 
(Schatz, 2000). Second, thanks to Eurasianism, the elites could integrate all ethnic groups and 
nations. In this regard, Kazakhs became first among equals, which is similar to the Soviet 
template (Russian first among equals) (Dinc, 2010). Transnational migration emphasizes the 
process of building strong ties with the homeland while developing hybridized or “transnational” 
social identities (Werner & Barcus, 2009).  
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 Kazakhs in outside of Kazakhstan were labelled as Oralman, when they returned to Kazakhstan. 
63 
 There is a debate over the Russification of Kazakhs and the purity of ‘oralmans.’ 
However, Kazakhs who had lived in non-Soviet countries have preserved a distinct Kazakh 
culture for centuries. This statement is also true of Mongolian Kazakhs. According to a survey 
which sought to examine the problems of integration among Mongolian Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, 
“the repatriated Kazakhs from Mongolia overwhelmingly (73.6 %) considered themselves 
“Kazakh” (n=637), with only 10.7 % embracing the hybridized identity of Mongolian-Kazakh or 
Kazakh-Mongolian “(Diener, 2013:473). However, this also shows that ethnic purity for 
Kazakhstan was still a prominent consideration. Moreover, 44 % of Mongolian-Kazakh 
‘Oralman’ (n= 642) and almost 60% of Kazakhs in Mongolia (n=546) thought that Mongolian 
Kazakhs were different than Kazakhstani Kazakhs (Diener, 2003:373). “Many of us grew up as 
herdsmen. We live as Kazakhs lived in history; our homes and tools are things you see in 
Kazakhstan’s museums, but we use them in our lives. We speak Kazakh in Kazakhstan changed 
during socialism, they become sophisticated, more like Russians, and we remain as Kazakhs” 
(Diener, 2003:373). 
 To the question: “Has living in Mongolia helped retain Kazakh cultural purity?” Fifty-
nine percent of Mongolian-Kazakh ‘Oralmans’ answered “Yes, very much”, so did 55 % of 
Kazakhs in Mongolia (Diener, 2013:471). 
 The cultural attitudes of the young in Kazakhstan are considered by scholars like Asiya 
et. al. (2014). The transformation of youth identify can be an indicator of globalization. Youth 
attitudes could also explain aspects of ethnic identity formation, during the process of becoming 
an adult. Moreover, it could show the differentiation among generations. Asiya et. al (2014) 
surveyed 100 students who were currently graduate students in Kazakhstan. Globalization was 
considered imperative for Kazakhstan’s modernization, and the changes in the official discourse 
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and the trilingual society showed that Kazakhstan is aware of global cultural trends. Forty-two % 
of the students thought that globalization had a positive meaning. However, 36 % emphasized 
that globalization destroyed cultural identities, while 15 % thought that globalization had created 
a cosmopolitan identity (Asiya et. al 2014:25). The finding of this study about consumer culture 
showed that the economic aspect of globalization was important to the young. Seventy % of the 
sample responded that they followed the latest global trends in fashion, technology, and 
entertainment. Furthermore, youth in Kazakhstan had various responses to the question “What 
determines the nationality?” Fifty-three % gave language as the dominant criterion of ethnic 
identity. Ethnic heritage of ancestors and religion were the other two crucial criteria for 42 % of 
the participants, although facial features were considered an important factor for 17 % of Kazakh 
participants and 25 % of Russian participants. Moreover, 52 % of the Kazakh respondents said 
they knew their national traditions and customs as did 33 % among the Russians. As a result, 
Kazakh youth consider preservation of language to be a major symbol of ethnic identity.  
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                                                        CHAPTER 4 
                            RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Turkey as the study site 
 Turkey has not been considered by many observers to be a hybrid society, but it has been 
the site of encounters, clashes, and many historical interactions between Turks and both 
indigenous people and migrants, consisting not only of Muslims but also Christians and Jews. 
The ability of Turks to contribute to culture can be traced starting from the western of China to 
the Balkans, while the multiethnic and multicultural society in Turkey can be explained by a 
Turkic idiom: “There are 66.5 nationalities in Turkey”. Immigration, emigration, and forced 
emigration have been major social and political factors that created these 66.5 nationalities of 
contemporary Turkey – a multi-ethnic society that is the result of the history of the region 
(Kirisci, 2003). Anatolia, the historical name of Turkey, has been a cradle of civilizations. And 
after the 1200s, the Ottoman Empire used mass migration as a cultural propagator – the remains 
it can be seen in the Balkans today.  
 During the Ottoman reign, ethnicity was affiliated with an administrative system that 
stemmed from the religion. Each religious community was constructed as ‘millet,’ meaning 
‘nation’ in English. Major nations such as Muslims, Orthodox Christians (Greek, Syriac), 
Armenian Apostolic Christians, and Jews had their own jurisdictional systems that also ensured 
religious freedom. Islam was the formal religion of the Ottoman Empire, and the Sultan was the 
Caliph of Sunni Muslims (Baran, 2010). From the 1000s to the 1800s, Turkic tribes had been 
migrating westward. The ‘millet’ system was ensured by sub-groups within each ‘millet.’ 
Migration waves to the Balkans turned to migration to Turkey after the 1800s. The “Sick Man of 
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Europe”, the Ottoman Empire, was looking for a new way to protect its territory. The doctrines 
of the French Revolution spread “the vulnerability of their empire to exploitation by European 
powers and to disintegration under pressure from independence movements” (Baran, 2010:17). 
The Ottoman Empire was going through a transformation not only to acquire European 
technologies but also to absorb minorities. Mahmut the II’s reforms launched the Westernization 
of Ottoman identity, although these were not able to preserve the ‘millet’ system. As a result, 
rebellious groups gained independence one after another.  
 The end of the 18
th
 and the 19
th
 century resulted in great political and demographic 
changes for the Ottomans. After the Balkan Wars, mass migrations and exchanges occurred 
between old Ottoman territories and new independent states. The European diplomatic 
intervention had great influence diluting the reforms. European states acquired influence in the 
Ottoman territory under the guise of the protecting Christian or minority rights. After the 
Crimean War, the great powers demanded greater autonomy for ethnic communities. After the 
war with Russia in 1877, the Ottomans lost their territories in Europe, Romania, Serbia, 
Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Armenia. While the loss of these territories emphasized a need for a 
pan-Islamic ideology, in time, after losing control over Arabia, the Turks constructed a 
nationalist ideology. A pan-Turkic movement – the Young Turks – spread over Istanbul, the 
Ottoman capital. This pan-Turkic identity included “Turan,” unite all Turkic nations under one 
country, which aimed to unite all Turks from the Balkans to Central Asia by emphasizing their 
common language.  
 After 1914, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire resulted in a creation of new Turkic 
identity under Ataturk’s definition. He tried to protect all ethnicities and religions. He created a 
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special Turkic identity for all of the different ethnicities, giving them citizenship. In this way, he 
emphasized the role of citizenship, rather than blood relationships, in nationality. 
Research on Ethnic Identity in Turkey 
 The research on ethnic identity in Turkey has mainly dealt with immigrants’ ethnic 
identity from the Balkans and non-Muslim populations (Unal & Demir, 2009, Unal, 2012, 
Sepetcioglu, 2010). Other Turkic immigrants require further study. 
  During 20
th
 century, large numbers of Muslims immigrated to Turkey, although many 
non-Muslims migrated from Turkey to Greece. Due to the Lausanne Population Exchange 
Agreement of 1923, a mass population exchange occurred. “Approximately 1.3 million ethnic 
Greeks were resettled in Greece, and about 500,000 ethnic Turks were resettled in Turkey 
(Bosswick, 2009:6)”. Taking this mass migration into consideration along with the 1.6 million 
immigrants who came to live in Turkey, we can to assume that Turkey is a suitable area to study 
ethnic identity, immigration, and hybridization. 
 Migration from old Ottoman territories shaped Turkey’s multiethnic society. According 
to Tekeli (2007), having the past 150 years, there were four types of migration. The first wave 
was the “balkanization migrations.” The second wave was the population exchanges between 
1945 and 1980. The third wave was internal migration among Turkish cities, and the final wave 
was based on “multiple life roots” that emphasized a desire for a modern life and new facilities. 
Multiethnic population in Turkey 
 A majority of the migrations occurred from the Balkans. More than 1, 6 million 
immigrants entered Turkey during the 1990s (Cesteneci, 2012). While the Kurds are the major 
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non-Turkish ethnic group in Turkey, the minority populations according to their primary 
language is shown in the Table 3 that shows there are many different ethnic groups in Turkey. 
Table 3: Non-Turkish Ethnic Groups in Turkey by Language (in 1,000’s)22 
                        1927         1935        1940        1945         1950         1955        1960        1965 
Kurdish         1,114       1,480        1,020        1,477       1,885       1,680       1,848       2,181 
Arabic              134          154            249          247          269          301          347          369 
Greek               120          109             81             89            89            80            65            49 
Armenian           65            58             58             56            53            56            53            33 
Ladino(Jews)     69            57             47            62             36            33            23              9 
Georgian           -               57               -             40             73            52            33             32 
Circassian          99           92               -              67            76             80            63            57 
Laz                    -               63               -             47            70             31            22             28 
Abaz                  -               10              -               9             17            14              4               5     
Tatar                 11             16              -              10               -             -                -               - 
Albanian           22             23             -               14             16            -                -              11 
Bulgarian          21             51             -               22             43           21            29               - 
Bosnak              -               25              -               13            24           12             15             14   
Russian             -                 5              -                 4              4              -               3              -      
Serbian             -                 4              -                 4               -              -               -               - 
English             2                1              -                  2              -              -             18             27  
French              8                5              -                  5              4             6               4              3            
German            -                 5              -                  2              2             5               5              5 
Zaza                 -                 -               -                 -               -              -                -           148 
 
 
 In 1985, refugees added to the complexity to the Turkish society. Almost a million 
Iranians fled to Turkey. In 1988, Kurds from Iraq, about 100,000 in number, escaped to Turkey 
in order to escape Saddam Hussein (Svanberg, 1989:68,Kirisci, 2003:2). On the other hand, the 
immigrants from the Balkan are made up a majority of Muslim migrants. The first wave was 
between 1923 and 1945 when 800,000 immigrants came from countries in Balkans. The second 
wave was in 1989 when 345,000 immigrants came from Bulgaria. The third wave which was 
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 Turkish Statistical Yearbook 1951-1964, Ankara 1951-1966, cited in Svanberg (1989).60. After 1965, Turkish 
Statistic Institution left to asked “What is your primary and secondary language?” This is the reason why there is 
no formal record after this period. 
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between 1992 and 2998 when 20,000 migrated from Bosnia; and the last wave was in 1999 when 
17,746 Kosovo citizens migrated to Turkey (Turkish Immigration Agency, 2015). Between the 
1960s and the 2000s, Turkey became a country that housed many foreign populations. Changes 
in migrant and their birth-place can be found in Table 4:  
Table 4: The population of Turkey-born and foreign-born people (Yakar, 2013:503). 
Years Born outside of 
Turkey 
The Proportion 
of foreign-born  
population  to 
population of 
Turkey 
Non-Turkish 
Citizens  
1950 755.526 3.61 - 
1960 952,515  3.43 54,955 
1970 889,170 2.50 39,543 
1980 868,195 1.94 50,642 
1990 1,113,152 2.01 245,600 
2000 1,260,530 1.86 267,441 
 
 The immigrants groups in Turkey have different background and condition (see Table 5 
for immigrant status). According to the OECD’s international immigration report (2014), there 
are 267,300 migrants in Turkey who have a residence permit of which 42 % (about 45,850) had 
work permits. Inflows to Turkey according to percent of foreigners are Azerbaijan 9 %, 
Afghanistan 8%, Russian Federation 7%, Germany 6%, United States 5%, Iran 5%, Kazakhstan 
4%, Turkmenistan 4%, Iraq 4% and United Kingdom 4%. The ongoing crisis in Syria increased 
the Syrian refugees in Turkey.  
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Table 5: Foreigners who have a residence permit and their status (Tourism not included), 
Turkish National Police, the Aliens, Borders and Asylums Agency) 
 
Years Employed Student Other reasons Total 
2012 20,740 31,282 159,451 211,473 
2011 23,027 37,260 156,919 217,206 
2010 19,351 29,266 128,327 176,944 
2009 17,483 27,063 118,780 163,326 
2008 18,900 28,597 127,429 174,926 
2007 24,881 28,455 171,872 225,208 
  
 In short, Turkey is a multiethnic country which has long been a country of immigration, 
hence the inhabitant people help to have these multi-ethnic structure (Figure 4). In Turkey, 
according to the Turkish Statistical Institution report in 2006, there were 48,709,000 adults, and 
6,524,000 of them stated their ethnicity as Kurds, while 38,043,000 were Turkish, while the  
 
Figure 4: The Distribution of Ethnic Identity (Milliyet, 2007). 
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 Apart from the general multi-ethnic society in Turkey, having a research in Istanbul and 
Nigde provide an interesting site to study ethnic identity and globalization, along with Kazakh 
identity. First, these two cities are different in terms of cosmopolitan characteristic. The 
population of Istanbul is approximately 15 million, although Nigde is house to 343 thousands. 
While Istanbul is highly a cosmopolitan city, which accommodates a large proportion of 
immigrants from all over the world, Nigde is a small and the immigrant population is also small.  
The Data Collection Process 
 I had a sample of 93 (N=93) participants. The sample included four Kazakhstani-born, 
three Chinese-born, and eighty six Turkish-born Kazakhs who were selected using snowball 
(reputational) sampling. They are residents of Istanbul and Nigde. While thirteen participants 
stayed in Nigde, the rest – eighty – were from Istanbul. In order to include those of all groups in 
terms of age and gender, I had forty-four females and forty-nine males from three age groups—
below-29, 30-49, and 50-63. Friends, family members, neighbors, acquaintances, social 
institution members, non-governmental organizations, ethnic associations, and village 
community members were also included in my study as participants. Chapter 5 presents the 
characteristics of the sample and overview of questions. 
 Finding participants and administering questionnaires were one of the hardest parts on 
writing this thesis. Moreover, determining the sample size required a big consideration since 
participants are the main component of studies. Having 93 participants from the Kazakh 
population in Turkey, which is approximately 15,000, enabled me to obtain medium sized data. 
Hence, it helped me observe my participants’ stories, while providing me with information to 
develop insights about the Kazakh society. In order to make my participants comfortable, I did 
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not to pay attention them when they were filling out the questionnaires and I let them ask 
questions about the questionnaire. I intend to obtain an extensive understanding about the 
characteristics of Kazakh ethnic identity formation in Turkey for examining whether a hybrid 
identity created. Information about questionnaires is included in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 Before the questionnaire, informed consent was provided in order to explain to 
participants about the context, the research purposes, interview length and the method of study 
(Appendix A). The survey was conducted during January and February of 2015. I encouraged 
participants to ask if there are some questions that not clear or need more explanations. I took 
notes when participants wanted to add more to the answers they were providing. Additional 
stories were recorded after participants requested to include their comments. I preferred not to 
include complex or long questions. On the other hand, open-ended questions help to elaborate 
information about participants’ view. Moreover, open-ended questions help participants to 
express their answers with their own words and it also provides to have more detailed 
information, while multiple choice questions provide quantitative  data (Fontana & Frey, 
2000:653). 
A problem arises when the answers to open-ended questions are generalized. This is 
dangerous for qualitative research. (Erickson, 2009:73). “A single narrative vignette or interview 
quote, however illuminating it might be as a “telling case” (Ibid, 73). In order to eliminate that 
possibility, I applied, as Erickson (2009) suggested, the relative frequency of occurrence with 
similar answers. While some explanatory clarifications from participants were not similar to 
other participants’ responses, this revealed the variety of participants. 
Questions were asked in Turkish. Some notes were also taken when participants were 
filling out the survey. Each interview approximately took twenty minutes. The completed 
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surveys were kept in a secured bag which has password. A special notebook for this study was 
organized in order to keep the stories of participants’ grandparents and historical information 
about exodus from China. A deep understanding was gained during interviews about the leather 
work, trade habits, and life style of Kazakhs.  
Data Analysis 
 Analyzing the data was one of the primary concerns for researchers. For structured and 
open-ended questions, the SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) was used to analyze 
the data. Moreover, there were some codes for participants
23
. There were mainly three groups: 
first one is the main demographic characteristic of participants, second is that ethnic identity 
retention and the third one is self-identification.’ In particularly, the hybrid form of identity was 
examined through Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.  
Limitations 
 Contacting wealthy Kazakhs was especially difficult. During the interviews in Istanbul, 
several attempts to include some wealthy Kazakhs were not finalized and complete 
questionnaires were not obtained so those are not included in this study. There are some 
participants who are relatively wealthy agreed to participate in the study.   
 
 
 
                                                          
23
 In Chapter 6, “the section of Kazakh Ethnic Identity”, ‘P’ was used to code the participants, and each number 
shows a specified participants (the participants’ personal information was not required, and I did not take any 
distinguishing features of participants). For example, ‘P1’ was used to show one participant’s responses to open-
ended question in his or her own word. 
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Ethics 
 Appendix A provided a written informed consent form for all interviewees (se in order to 
inform them about the concept of study and participants’ rights. They also informed about the 
sensitivity of ethnic identity studies. 
 I benefitted from a bunch of previous studies shed our way for conducting the 
questionnaire. Same questions were taken from both the Eurobarometer 71, and Chiu, (2003)’ 
study and then were applied. While Isajiw, (1990)’s methodology was this study’s main 
framework, I benefitted from Chiu (2003)’ study --focuses on Hakka ethnic identity formation in 
Canada -- for ethnic identity retention. 
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                                                                 CHAPTER 5 
 PARTICIPANTS’ DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILES AND RETENTION OF KAZAKH 
IDENTITY 
  
 Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 cover the empirical findings from a study consisting of a survey 
with Kazakhs in Turkey, in the cities of Istanbul and Nigde. The responses to multiple-choice 
questions and some open-ended questions were presented in the Chapter 5 that has three main 
objects. First, it explains some background information about the sample and examines different 
age groups based on self-identification with ethnic identity retention. Moreover, in this Chapter, 
three major themes: demography, media, and external and internal retention of Kazakh identity 
are examined. The sample helps us to have detailed information about Kazakhs in Turkey. 
Second, the chapter examines Kazakh participants in terms of gender, age and socio-economic 
status. Lastly, Chapter 5 concludes Kazakh identity retention of participants in terms of gender, 
socio-economic status, and age. In conclusion, Chapter 6 presents sample’s preferences for 
organized questions and also explains participants’ identity, in particular, the Turkic and Kazakh 
identity under three major globalization approaches: homogenization, polarization and 
hybridization. 
  
 
 
 
76 
Demographic Profile of Participants 
 The characteristics of participants were obtained through the information about the place 
of birth, gender, and socio-economic status and the summary of these answers are presented in 
Table 6. The participants from my study were born in Turkey, Kazakhstan, China- East-
Turkestan, or Pakistan. Thus, Turkey was the primary country for 94 % of the Kazakhs and the 
remaining 6% and was born in Kazakhstan, China, and Pakistan (Figure 5).      
The gender representation was almost equal for the sample group consisting of 53% males and 
47% females (see Table 6).   
 The age distribution of males is 
relatively extended while women in the 
study were younger than the average 
age. The mean age for man was 40 years 
old, while the mean age for women was 
25 years old. 
      Figure 5: Kazakh participants’ place of birth  
Both females and males were interviewed in three age groups: under 29, 30-49, and 50-68. 
 
 
 
 
Turkey
China, East
Turkestan
Kazakhstan
Pakistan
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Table 6: Selected Demographic Characteristic of Kazakhs in Turkey 
 Kazakhs  
Gender (%) 
     Female  
     Male  
 
47 
53 
Age Group (%) 
     15-29  
     30-49  
     50- 68 
 
53 
26 
21 
Country of Born( Frequency) 
     Turkey 
     China, East Turkestan 
     Kazakhstan 
     Afghanistan 
     Pakistan 
 
94 
1 
4 
1 
1 
Level of Education (%) 
     Completed Elementary School 
     Completed High School  
     Bachelor’s degree 
     Master Degree 
 
26 
52 
22 
2 
Employment Status (%) 
      Employed 
      Unemployed 
      Retired 
      Student 
      Housewife 
 
47 
2 
10 
37 
4 
Occupation (%) 
      Public Sector 
      Private-Sector(as employee) 
      Self-employed 
      Student  
      Domestic or homecare 
      Non-profit organization 
 
5 
25 
15 
33 
10 
7 
Individual Monthly Income 
      0-320 (tl) 
      321-950(tl) 
      951-1500 (tl) 
      1501-2500 (tl) 
      2501- above(tl) 
      Not Stated 
 
3 
12 
33 
14 
7 
33 
House Location (%) 
      City-center 
       Rural 
       Not Stated 
 
77 
20 
3 
Room Number (%) 
       2 Rooms 
       3 Rooms 
       4 Rooms 
       5 Rooms 
        Not Stated 
 
18 
34 
26 
12 
10 
Sample Size (see note in page 78) 93  
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 Overall, the participants in this study tended to be younger Kazakhs. The first age group 
consisted of 15 to 29 (53%). 26% were between 30 and 49. Thus, most of the participants were 
relatively young (Figure 6), while elderly people also consisting of 21 percent of participants. 
 
 
Figure 6: Age groups of participants 
 
Socio-economic Status 
 The level of education, employment status, individual income, insurance information, and 
house ownership with the room number in the houses were used for understanding of 
participants’ socio-economic status (Table 6). In general, Kazakhs in Turkey tended to have 
lower education levels, although labor force participation is relatively high.  
 Rather than emphasizing on education, nomadic Kazakhs were prone to be traders. From 
the beginning of their settlement in Istanbul, Kazakhs have been involved in commerce. During 
their first year in Istanbul, Kazakhs dwelt in three camps: Sirkeci, Zeytinburnu, and Tuzla. 
Kazakhs were not allowed to work and not allowed to move out of the camps. The script below 
is from one of my participant’s memories of these early days: 
29 and below
30-49
50-63
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 “When we were in the Zeytinburnu camp, the rule did not let us to go outside. But we got 
bored; we wanted to do some good things for Turks because they helped us a lot. Then, we were 
escaping after breakfast and working in construction of Mosques for free. At around six pm, we  
were going back to camp. After a while, the workers in this construction area became dissatisfied 
because their bosses decreased their wages because of hardworking free Kazakhs. For these 
days, the Jews saw how hardworking Kazakhs were. They gave us free tablecloths which are 
made by plastic and relatively cheap. The Jews were so rich. Anyway, we started to earn more by 
selling those clots in the streets of Istanbul, and then we paid our debt to Jews and the trade 
relations increased. Then after we become free of the camps, we tried to work in leather so we 
earned a lot. It was a crazy thing to go school – that just took time. For instance, when my 
brother become a school teacher, he spent his time in school, he was paid just 1 unit while I was 
earning 5 units by selling my leather hat in the streets within five hours a day”.24 
 Seventy-seven percent of participants had primary and high school degrees. However, 
only 23 % of the participants had a Bachelor’s or a Master’s degree (Figure 7).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 I included this story because it is probably the most common among all Kazakhs in Turkey. I received similar 
stories from almost every participant. 
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Figure 7: Education level according to gender            
 In Turkey, 77% of Kazakh participants aged 15-68 had earned at least a high-school 
degree, compared to only 32% of adults aged 25-64. According to the OECD (2014), 36% of 
males graduated from high-school compared with 27% of female Turkish counterparts (Figure 
7). However, new regulations ensured an increase in education levels in Turkey. The gender 
difference in educational attainment still continues, especially at the primary level. Women are 
less educated than males. 
            While a high school degree was the highest education for both two groups – female and 
male Kazakhs – the Kazakh males are able to pursue their education than Kazakh female in 
Turkey. In addition, Kazakhs in this study had at least completed grade school.  Furhermore, 
only two males were able to acquire a Master’s degree, while there were nineteen Kazakhs who 
had a Bachelor’s degree. Hence, first generation Kazakhs in Turkey were not likely to pursue 
further education at university, while the profit in trade made older Kazakhs able to do so. 
Therefore, the high school education rate among the younger generation could be a step toward 
university education. 
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 We cannot estimate the relationship for employment status between two groups—female 
and males- by looking the slight variation in educational levels. Therefore, I included questions 
into survey which ask participants’ jobs, salaries. Thirty-seven percent of participants were 
students, and 47% were employees. The Kazakhs are close to Turks (the employment rate—paid 
job-- among Turks  49%  for aged 15 to 64 ), and the gender difference for Turks is similar. 
Almost 69% of Turkish had paid work, while 29% of Turkish females was able to earn their 
money (OECD Better Life Index, Turkey, 2014), while Kazakh women are able to find some 
space in the workplace: approximately 15% (Figure 8). Thirty-three percent of men gained full 
employed status in the labor force. Since a patriarchal family system still exists valid in both 
Turkish and Kazakh societies, the difference in employment between men and women was 
predictable. However, almost 10% of participants were retired, and 4% of women chose their 
occupational status as “housewife.” Two percent of participants were unemployed. Overall, in 
Turkey, low-skilled females and young people are still vulnerable. 
 
 Figure 8: Work status according to gender 
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 Self-employment among Kazakhs seems the main mode of occupation. Almost 6% of 
Kazakhs preferred to work within 
the public sector, while the private 
sector and self-employment were 
more preferred-- the former 25% 
and the latter 15%.  
“Moreover, maintaining a strong 
commitment to the culture of origin                    
after immigration helped 
immigrants             
 to get employment, when                                Figure 9: House ownership 
a well preserved knowledge of the mother tongue, maintained skills ethnic identity increases the 
possibility to find a job  in host country” (Zimmermann, Constant, & Gataulina, 2006). Many 
Kazakhs were interested in leather, and solidarity is common among Kazakhs. And participants’ 
general tendency is having private sector on leather works. When a Kazakh needs a job, other 
Kazakhs are ready to offer one because of common ethnicity (Subanova, 2013:81). 
  Taking into account ownership, it is helpful to have information about the rooms and 
location of houses in order to gain a more extensive knowledge about the living standards of 
participants.  An overwhelming 80% of Kazakhs owned their own homes while 16% of 
participants were tenants (Figure 9). Four percent of the participants did not state whether they 
owned a house. In order to have a better sense of life quality among Kazakhs, the number of 
rooms would be another factor to observe in order to decide about the well-being of participants. 
The question was asked: “How many rooms do you have?,” and answer choices were presented 
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as two rooms plus one living room, three rooms plus one living room, and so on(see Appendix B 
for a complete set of questions). It is clear that Kazakhs would like to live in homes or 
apartments with more rooms. Thus, 26% of the participants had four-room apartments (plus one 
living room) compared to 12% of residents who lived in five-room apartments. Only 18 per cent 
had two-room apartments (see Table 6).  
 The location of houses helps us draw a general picture of Kazakh well-being. Seventy-
seven percent of participants had homes in the center of the city, although 22.5 % had homes in 
rural areas such as villages
25
. 
 By taking account of the monthly income of Kazakhs, we gain information about the 
economic performance of participants. Although the economic performance of immigrants takes 
27 years to reach those of native-born, Turks
26
, we should focus on how their preferences about 
occupation were formed.  
 Thirty-one percent of the participant earned 846-1500 Turkish Liras, which is higher than 
the minimum subsistence level. While 11% were at this level. 5% of participants had the highest 
levels in this study, and 31% had in between earning levels.  
  The retirement plans of Kazakhs varied from SSK, the mandatory insurance for paid-
workers which is provided by employers, and BAGKUR, which is also mandatory system that 
requires having insurance for employers. These two plans provide general retirement plans. And, 
some other retirement programs such as national bank program for retirement. Thirty-nine 
percent of participants had the SSK retirement plan which is mandatory for every employee. For 
the self-employed, BAGKUR was preferred by 21% of participants, compared to 3% who 
preferred individual retirement plans. On the other hand, house, earthquake, and automobile 
                                                          
25
 The participants in Nigde have lived in Altay Village, so all of them dwell in rural areas. 
26
 Thomas & P., 1998,  and Bloom, 1995 find that Canadian immigrants need 27 years to earn the same salary that 
is earned by native-born Canadian. 
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insurance are not common among participants. While 60% of participants did not want to answer 
this question, 10% of the rest had home insurance, and 5% had earthquake insurance. 
Automobile insurance was taken out by 13% of the participants. In sum, Kazakhs in this sample 
occupy average ranks on the socio-economic ladder. They possess average education that has 
allowed them to attain average individual incomes. 
External and Internal Retention of Kazakh Identity 
 Taking into account varying everyday practices such as religious piety, using native 
language, traditional art, literature, leisure activities, clothing, and music, we can gain some idea 
of cultural identity (Bhugra, et al., 1999; Sobal, 1998). 
 In order to explore cultural hybridization among Kazakhs in Turkey, I needed to see how 
their identity had changed and how their identity carried new applications. As stated earlier, 
ethnic identity have external and internal aspects. The third part of this chapter describes findings 
on the retention of ethnic identity. In this, I aimed to link the effect of cultural globalization on 
Kazakh and Turkic identities. The findings on retention or non-retention are presented in Table 
7. Questions were asked based on six cultural characteristics in order to analyze retention of 
ethnic identity; the questions revealed information about eating Kazakh food, country 
preferences for food
27
, speaking fluent Kazakh, attending Kazakh feasts, special gatherings 
(“toy”28),  ethnic friendship, and media preferences (see Appendix B for a complete set of 
questions). 
 
                                                          
27
 I did not look at shopping preferences since there are no Kazakh groceries in either Istanbul or Nigde and spent 
time to find out more about Kazakh was the level of knowledge of Kazakh history. 
28
 Toys are a king of group meetings, which aimed to share feeling with community. The major types of toys are 
wedding ceremonies, circumcision feasts, pilgrim celebrations, soldier sendoffs, and so on. 
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Table 7: The Retention of Ethnic Identity. 
External Aspects of Kazakh identity and Importance 
        
       Speaking Kazakh at home (%) 
 
 
Often              Sometimes         Never        
47                      37                    17    
 
 
 
 
        
         Eat Kazakh food (%) 
Kazak Manti    Toy Pilavi   Kazak Tea  
17                       1                    7    
 
        Providing food (%) 
Kazakh-Turkey   East Turkestan   Turkey 
35                            1                         60 
        Attending Kazakh associations, and meetings 
 
Never          Sometimes              Often 
0                        7                          91     
        Ethnic friendship (%) Turkish        Kazakh                 Other 
42                 41                          17 
       Media (%) In Turkish   In Kazakh              Both 
70                 4                            25 
Internal Aspects of Kazakh Identity  
        Affective 
        Stronger attachment towards Kazakhs than other 
ethnic groups (%) 
 
 
Yes                No          Character is important 
17                   3              80 
        Fiducial 
         Trust Kazakhs more than other ethnic groups(%) 
         
 
Not Important  Very Impor.Charac.Imp.* 
3                         17                          80     
          
         Cognitive 
         Spending effort to find out more about Kazakhs(%)      
 
  Good           Average                Poor 
     30              36                          26 
        Moral (Part 1) 
         Speaking Kazakh (%) 
Often             Sometimes           Never 
  46                 37                         17 
       Moral( Part 2) 
       Marry within the Kazakh community (%) 
Not Important   Very important  
69                           26 
*Charac. Imp. Means Character of person is important for trust.  
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Eating habits 
  Since food is very important factor for identity (Fischler, 1988), eating habits have 
special importance. Therefore, it helps to examine food choices to determine external retention 
or non-retention of Kazakh identity. Benefitting from food choices is one of the cultural practices 
and preferences of participants. We may receive valuable insights about adaption, diversity, 
identification, distancing, and integration the levels of individual or collective tendencies (Koc & 
Welsh, 2003:46). Thirteen options were used to measure food preferences of Kazakhs-- Turkish 
Dumplings, Kazakh Dumplings, Ozbek Dumplings, Makrube, Imambayildi, Baklava, Cigkofte, 
Beshbarmak, Hamburger, Toy Pilavi, Turkish Tea, Turkish coffee, and Kazakh Tea. Immigrants 
feel at home when eating their national foods. People experience their identity through accessing 
food, especially the “comfort food”, but also to culturally appropriate foods (Koc & Welsh, 
2003:47). 
Turkish cuisine can offer much. Kazakh cuisine is welcoming and will provide you with 
many options if you like to eat meat. As pastoral nomads, the Kazakhs developed their cuisine 
directly from their animals, using milk and meat. Thus, Kazakh tea with added hot milk, black 
pepper, and other spices, is desirable. However, the diet of nomads cannot be reduced as animal 
products (Kunanbaeva, 2008). Even the style of presentation or the taste of the food could make 
a difference. I included three types of dumplings present in the distinct cuisines. Many Kazakhs 
in Turkey mentioned their special “Kazakh Dumplings,” which are very similar to “Turkish 
Dumplings” and “Ozbek Dumplings,” except in size. Kazakh cuisine is dominated by meat. 
While Kazakhs and other Turkic ethnic groups’ cuisines include similar ingredients, ingredients 
unique to the Kazakh cuisine were revealed along with questions about global meals such as 
hamburgers, Coca Cola, and iced Tea. 
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 While dumplings seems to be the most delicious food of Kazakhs, 12% of participants 
chose it in Turkish style, although 17% preferred Kazakh style – Uzbek style was chosen by 16% 
of the participants. On the other hand, as an international food, hamburgers were chosen by 9% 
of the participants. Other Turkic delicacies were preferred by Kazakhs – 7% preferred 
“imambayildi”, which is meat with eggplant, 8% preferred Baklava, and 5% preferred Cigkofte; 
another Kazakh dish, Toy Pilavi was preferred by 1%. At the same time, Maklube, which is also 
common throughout the Turkic world, was only preferred by 9% of the participants. 
 When it comes to beverages, the traditional Kazakh tea was preferred more that Turkish 
tea, Turkish coffee, or Cola. Thus 2% of participants indicated both Turkish tea and coffee as 
their favorite beverage, while Kazakh tea was favored by 7%. 
 
Country preferences for food 
 Again, the eating habits and creating one’s own cuisine are important indicators of 
cultural identity. According to Mintz (2008), African slaves in the Caribbean gained their 
masters’ awareness by their taste in food. Food and cooking are factors that create the building-
blocks in reconstruction of culture and cultural identity (Mintz (2008) cited in Claxton, 2008:1) 
(Claxton, 2008). Having access to food from East Turkestan was an indicator of external aspects 
of Kazakh ethnic identity. At the same time this measure could provide a broader view of 
cultural globalization. The young generation’s preferences provided a more general cultural 
globalization pattern than Turkic ones. 
Most of the Kazakhs are happy to be in Turkey regarding food. Turkish food is not 
unfamiliar to them. They are able to eat halal food, fresh vegetables, and so on. They also try 
new kinds chocolate made by Turkish chefs. They stated that there is no difference in food 
products. That is why they do not need to give order food from another country or open a local 
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grocery selling Kazakh products except ’kimiz,’ or ‘kumiss’  which a is special Turkic drink that 
is more common in Central Asia. As long ago as Herodotus, kumiss made from fermented 
mare’s milk became an inseparable part of nomadic culture (Kunanbaeva, 2008:53). Therefore, 
except for this national food, most of the participants reported that their first choice was Turkish. 
Sixty percent of participants were only shopped for Turkish foods, while 38% needed products 
from Kazakhstan, with just 1% preferring Russia as a supplier. Kazakhs seemed happy regarding 
food products. 
The Kazakh language 
 Kazakh is a Turkic language. Turkic languages include 25 closely related dialects or 
subgroups belonging to the Kipchak (or Northwestern Turkic) branch (Ataov, 1992:169). 
Therefore, it is closely related to other Turkic languages and there exists mutual understanding 
among them. According to Kessikbayeva and Cicekci (2014), words in Kazakh can be generated 
from root words recursively by adding proper Turkish suffixes.  
 Language may be a powerful indicator of ethnic identity, and most of the time language 
would separate people. Surprisingly, Kazakhs showed only weak a memory of the Kazakh 
dialect: eleven percent of participants said their mother tongue was Kazakh, while 73% spoke 
Turkish as their first language and 7% of participants said both Kazakh and Turkish were the 
native languages. (Ten percent of participants did not state their mother tongue). 
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Figure 10: The level of Kazakh language  
 
 On the one hand, the Kazakh language skill level is in the middle. Fifty percent of 
participants were fluent while 35% chose to rate their language skill as average (Figure 10). 
Lastly, 15 per cent were not fluent in Kazakh. On the other hand, participants who chose their 
native language as Turkish said they were fluent in Kazakh, while those who chose their native 
language as Kazakh were not fluent in Kazakh. Hence, percentage of speaking Kazakh at home 
also showed that participants were not speaking Kazakh at home frequently: Forty-six percentage 
of participants said often while 37 % stated ‘sometimes’ and 17 % stated ‘never’ (See Table 7). 
 Apart from the mother tongue, we must stress the relationship between Kazakh and 
Turkish. Kazakh and Turkish are closely related, and there is mutual intelligibility among them 
(Kessikbayeva & Cicekli, 2014). Twenty-four percent of participants thought that Kazakh and 
Turkish were very similar, while 68% thought they were relatively similar. In sum, 91% thought 
that these two languages were similar. Seven percent said the two languages were different and 
3% said they were very different. 
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One of my participants                      
included extra notes to the question 
asking how close Turkish and Kazakh 
language were: 
It is much the same, just climate had 
affected the Kazakh language in Asia, 
and the volume of the two languages 
became a little bit different. However, 
I should say when I went to 
Kazakhstan for a trip that I 
experienced some difficulties                      Figure 11: Closeness of Turkish and Kazakh 
about understanding Kazakhstan’ Kazakh.  I felt that I was completely able to understand them, 
but I hesitated to speak.  
 
Attending Kazakh association meetings 
Social meetings among Kazakhs have ensured ethnic-racial socialization. Although some 
of these meetings provided transmissions of cultural values, knowledge, and practices, practicing 
some of the cultural practices led society to discriminate the younger generation. In the same 
way, ethnic-racial socialization influences the ethnic identity, self-esteem, and biases (Hughes et 
al., 2006:764) which could occur in activities of ethnic associations.  
The nomadic past of Kazakhs has given special importance to group meetings, which are 
generally called “toys.” The major types of toys are wedding ceremonies, circumcision feasts, 
pilgrim celebrations, soldier sendoffs, and so on. Based on several studies and my own survey, it 
was clear that Kazakhs in Turkey are well organized communities that have come together in 
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ethnic associations; most of which are managed by Kazakhs. Kazakh Unions, organizations, and 
association have preserved cultural practices. For instance, playing the Dombira
29
 and Kazakh 
motifs on carpets – through carpet weaving courses – and leather courses. Hence, Kazakh toys, 
picnics, and traditional Kazakh dance groups are prominent events organized by these 
organizations. On the whole, Kazakhs gave greater emphasis to attending ethnic celebrations and 
festivities. Ninety-one percent of participants often attend Kazakh meetings and make an effort 
to have Kazakh events and activities. They raise money for cultural activities, courses, and 
lectures. They are also sensitive to teaching their traditional life style to new generations via 
cultural unions and associations. None of the participants chose “I have never attended a Kazakh 
meeting” which shows that these meetings have great importance for Kazakhs. 
Ethnic friendship 
 For Kazakhs, integration with both Turks and other ethnic groups was a key feature of 
question asked in this section, although being Kazakh is still an important consideration in 
choosing a friend. Almost every participant in the survey paused before answering the question 
about their best friend’s ethnicity. They stated that the ethnicity of a person does not matter, and 
they paid more attention to the personality of the friend. Figure 12 presents the ethnic friendship 
preferences of participants does not based on ethnic Kazakhness. As Figure 12 presents that for 
participants, having close friends from different ethnic groups is very common, while ethnically 
Turks and Kazakhs more popular. Forty-two percent of participants had very close Turkish 
friends, while 41 % had Kazakh friends as very close friend. It also shows that integration with 
society can be seen through ethnic friendship, while it is an indicator for ethnic identity retention: 
if an immigrant has close friends from host country, it is a indicator to show ethnic identity 
retention is not strong. 
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 Dombira is traditional Kazakh music instrument. 
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Figure 12: Ethnicity of friends 
 Participants had relationships with other Kazakhs living in Kazakhstan and East 
Turkestan. Sixty-three percent of participants had friends and relatives in Kazakhstan, while only 
30% had friends in East Turkestan. Although 60% of the participants originally came from East 
Turkestan, Kazakhstan was their home country as well. The Kazakh government provided many 
rights to ‘Oralmans’. About 1 million ethnic Kazakhs have returned to Kazakhstan from 
neighboring countries owing to Kazakhstan’s returnee policies (Bokayev, 2013:791).The Kazakh 
government provided attractive incentives to returning ‘Oralmans’ such as covering 
transportation expenses, housing, and a guaranteed job. Kazakhstan is still their home country, 
although they may actually come from East Turkestan. 
Media preferences 
 I included the participants’ media preferences to obtain a deeper understanding of ethnic 
identity retention. Media preferences are an indicator of identity. The literature concerning 
immigrants and the media of indigenous and ethnic communities illustrates that there is a need to 
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study more about immigrants the media (Spoonley, 2004:4). The media preferences of 
participants reveal the attraction of Turkic media for them. Turkic media dominates Kazakh 
media. In addition, Russian media is dominant in Kazakhstan and has also had an impact on 
Kazakh media preferences. For a long time, broadcasting in Kazakh was not possible or less 
preferred during the period of Russian language domination. Fifty-four percent of participants 
did not watch Kazakh TV, while 11% preferred to watch between 1 and 2 hours a week. Six 
percent preferred Kazakh channels for 2 to 3 hours, 3% watched TV in Kazakh for 10 hours a 
week, and only 2% of participants watched Kazakh channels for 30 hours. 
 Fifty-eight percent of the participants enjoyed both Turkish and Kazakh music. In 
addition, Kazakh music was listened by 17%, and only 10% of the participants listened only to 
Turkish music. While the Korean wave--the rising influence of South Korea in sector of media, 
music and fashion-- was favored by 3% of the participants, 8% listened to Kazakh, Turkish, and 
English music. Some of the participants also emphasized their preferences for English, while 
only two participants added German to their preferences. Young participants also noted that they 
favored Korean music. As expected, 70% of the participants chose to read Turkish newspapers 
and listen to Turkish radio, although 4% stated as that they preferred Kazakh media. In addition, 
25% of the participants preferred a mix of Turkish and Kazakh media. 
 Overall, the importance of being Kazakh and the Kazakhs’ relationship to their Turkic 
roots were emphasized during this survey. Participants placed strong importance on consumption 
of Turkic food, while feeling unhappy about not being fluent in Kazakh. An estimate of 91% of 
the participants agreed that Turkish and Kazakh are similar languages. Moreover, Kazakh 
meetings are important factors for Kazakhs, as they are seen as preserving culture, heritage, and 
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Kazakh values. The main difference between young and old generations is the degree they speak 
Kazakh. 
 After considering the external retention of Kazakh identity; participants showed a weak 
ethnic identity retention in case of food preferences, speaking Kazakh at home and media, 
although ethnic friendship, and participating ethnic gatherings with associations’ activities 
provided a high ethnic identity retention. I turn to the internal aspects of Kazakh identity in the 
next section. The four dimensions are affective, fiducial, cognitive, and moral aspects of internal 
retention. Participants answered five questions in this section of the survey. 
Affective dimension 
 
 It can be assumed that Kazakhs feel comfortable when interacting with other Kazakhs. If 
a participant feels that he or she will be more comfortable with a Kazakh, it is sufficient to say 
there are affective feelings. The question of measuring the affective dimension was asked as “Do 
you feel comfortable with Kazakhs rather than other groups.” Sixty-seven percent of participants 
said they would feel more comfortable in a relationship with a Kazakh, while 23% stated that 
ethnicity would not make a difference. 
Fiducial dimension 
 The fiducial dimension is closely related to the affective dimension. Kazakhs have 
greater trust in other Kazakhs. There is an old saying there are no friends for Turks except other 
Turks and Kazakhs believe that ethnic Kazakhness is usually sufficient for a friend but trust is 
another issue. Thus, 17% of the participants agreed to trust someone because he or she is 
Kazakh, while individual personality was more important for 80% of the participants. 
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Cognitive dimension 
 Kazakhs are happy with their traditions such as narratives, stories, and historical past. 
The habits of keeping their historical past alive are an indicator of retention of identity. In short, 
how Kazakhs link their past with their future. Grandparents and their offspring have close 
relationships. The “Shezhyre” tradition is also one of the main characteristics of being Kazakh30. 
Eighty-three percent of participants agreed they pay attention to these kinds of cognitive 
components of identity. Participants were willing to visit their ancestral country. Listening to 
stories from grandparents is not the only element in the cognitive dimension. Having friends and 
travelling to historical sites are also important. As a result, travel to China and Kazakhstan is 
common among the participants; thirty-nine percent had a chance to go, while 62% did not.  
 In the case of having friends from their historical country, 64% of participants had friends 
in Kazakhstan while 35% did not. Twenty-seven percent of participants had friends in East 
Turkestan while 65% did not. Again, most of the participants had originally come from East 
Turkestan (69%), but as stated earlier, Kazakhstan seems to be the country of all Kazakhs. 
 
Moral dimension 
 Last but not least, the moral dimension determines the degree of importance and the 
sense of obligation participants have toward the community. I looked at three elements: Kazakh 
language skills, history, and marrying according to Kazakh ethnicity. Because of the moral 
dimension, the important point is the ability of a person to care for their historical roots and have 
a determination to pass them to their children, while marrying according to ethnicity
31
.  
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 A shezhre is a document -genealogical family tree- which shows horde information and seven generations of 
their ancestry 
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 For this study, the term intermarriage refers to marriages between Kazakhs and Turks or Kurds. 
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 As noted earlier, 23% of participants are fluent in the Kazakh language. Twenty-eight 
percent are good at it, 35% are not good at it, and 15% had poor Kazakh language skills. On the 
other hand, 73% of the participants cited Turkish as their mother tongue, 10% of the participants 
stated it was Kazakh, and 7% mentioned both when asked this question. 
Intermarriage is another measure for assessing the moral dimension
32
. In the 
questionnaire, I asked: “Are you married?” If the participant answered “yes,” the next question 
was: “What is the ethnicity of your spouse?” If the participant was not married, the following 
question was asked: “Is getting married to a Turk a problem for you? (Could you describe why 
or why not?).” It was hard to examine the answers of these questions during the survey and in the 
data analysis. Sixty-nine percent of participants were willing to marry a Turk, while 29% 
preferred to marry a Kazakh. On the other hand, several participants discussed the implications 
of this question. For instance, one of the participants told me he was married to a Kazakh. He 
continued by asking: “Why are you asking about marriage with a Turk? Is my Kazakh wife not a 
Turk?”  
 In conclusion, several similarities and differences were observed. Internally, Kazakhs 
displayed a stronger retention community involvement through participation in both associations 
and social events and meetings. Then, Kazakhs internally felt and retained their ethnic identity 
thanks to knowledge acquisition. In short, Kazakhs in Turkey presented a strong retention of 
affective and cognitive features while weakly retaining moral and fiducial dimensions. 
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 Intermarriage is not only considered one of the most definitive measures of the dissolution of social and cultural 
barriers, but also integration of different races, because it is the result of close social interactions between people 
of two different  races and ethnicities (Kalmijin & Flap, 2001:) 
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Kazakh Identity and Demographic Characteristics 
 To understand Kazakh identity, the mean values of six dimensions of ethnic identity were 
identified. These included gender, age, and socio-economic status. Each of these three subjects 
was divided into subcategories. Female and male were categories for gender, and three groups, 
15-29, 30-49, and 50-68 were subcategories for age. In order to examine socio-economic status, 
education level, type of occupation, landownership, and insurance information were looked at. 
Then, I analyzed whether retention of Kazakh ethnic identity could be observed in participants. 
The six prominent ethnic identity dimensions (Chiu, 2003:111) were used in order to measure in 
what extent of Kazakhs retained their ethnic identity. These six ethnic identity aspects were 
whether or not the participant spoke the Kazakh language, attended Kazakh functions, had 
Kazakh friends and strong ties with the Kazakh community, providing Kazakh food, and 
attending Kazakh meetings.  
Kazakh identity according to gender 
Table 8 shows the average score of the six dimensions. Kazakh males exhibited a score of 
1.7 and Kazakh females a score of 1.8. Some measures were close in value: Kazakh meetings 
(1.0 for males and 1.1 for females) and ethnic friendship (1.4 for males and 1.5 females). On the 
other hand, the variation in each mean score among four dimensions was very small (the 
variation from 0.1 to 0.3 was common except in ethnic friendship, which was 0.9). These 
findings support the conclusion that  there is no relationship between ethnic identity and gender. 
 
 
 
 
98 
Table 8: Ethnic Identity Means according to Gender 
Ethnic Identity dimension                                               
Gender 
 
 
Males 
 
Females 
Speaking Kazakh Language at home 1.6 1.9 
Attending Kazakh Meetings 1.0 1.1 
Ethnic friendship 1.4 1.5 
Strong Sense of Attachment towards Kazakhs 2.5 2.8 
The knowledge about Kazakh History 2.0 1.8 
Media 1.7 1.4 
Average (6 Dimension) 1.7 1.8 
N=93 49 44 
 
 
Kazakh identity according to age 
 
 Table 9 presents that the likelihood of individuals acquired an ethnic identity with 
increasing age – argued by Phinney (1989) – was not the use for Kazakhs in Turkey. The average 
scores are close among the three age groups. Furthermore, younger participants (aged under 29 
and 30-49) had a value of 1.7, very close to the oldest group in retaining of Kazakh identity. The 
oldest group (50-68) had a value of 1.8. 
Table 9: Ethnic Identity Means according to three Age Groups 
Ethnic Identity dimension Age 
 
 
Under 29 
 
30-49 
 
50-68 
Speaking Kazakh Language at home 1.8 1.7 1.6 
Attending Kazakh Meetings 1.0 1.0 1.2 
Ethnic friendship 1.4 1.6 1.5 
Strong Sense of Attachment towards Kazakhs 2.8 2.6 2.6 
The knowledge about Kazakh History 2.0 2.0 1.7 
Media 1.4 1.5 2.0 
Average (6 Dimension) 1.7 1.7 1.8 
N=93 49 24 20 
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Kazakh identity according to socio-economic status 
 As can be seen in Table 10, each group had similar mean scores for education, 1.7 for 
non-university graduates and 1.8 for university graduates. The mean scores of attending Kazakh 
meetings and media are also close. The variations in the mean scores among three ethnic identity 
dimensions (attending Kazakh meetings, strong sense of attachment toward Kazakhs, and media 
preferences) were relatively small (a difference of 0.1-02). As a result, we could not reach a 
relationship between ethnic identity and education. 
 
Table 10: Ethnic Identity Means according to Socio-Economic Status 
Ethnic Identity Dimension                      
                        Education 
Non-University 
Graduates 
(Elementary and High 
School) 
 
University 
Graduates 
(Bachelor’s and 
Master Degree) 
Speaking Kazakh at home 1.6 2.0 
Attending Kazakh Meetings 1.0 1.1 
Ethnic friendship 1.3 1.8 
Strong Sense of Attachment towards Kazakhs 2.6 2.8 
The knowledge about Kazakh History 2.0 1.7 
Media 1.5 1.4 
Average (6 Dimension) 1.7 1.8 
N=93 72 21 
  
By examining the Kazakhs in Turkey, what we found is this study bolstered previous 
studies in terms of gender and socio-economic status, while it did not support the previous 
studies for age.  
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                                                                   CHAPTER 6   
      KAZAKH IDENTITY IN TURKEY AND THREE PROMINENT GLOBALIZATION 
APPRAOACHES  
 Since ethnic identity retention among participants present a half ethnic identity retention, 
defining new identity of participants requires a new points to examine. Therefore, self-
identification is beneficial to place individual’ himself in an ethnicity. 
Self-Ethnic Identification 
 The ethnic activities could help us to analyze ethnic identity as Breton et al (1990: 25) 
stressed. According to him, self-identification and using language are very important 
characteristics for ethnic identity. Since the sample showed that Kazakhs in Turkey have retained 
their ethnic identity in middle, we need to explore how they define themselves. In this chapter, 
the sample’ ethnic identification is discussed. We found that thirty-nine percent of participants in 
this study identified themselves by multiple/hybrid ethnic identities. Fifty-two percent of 
participants asserted a single identity: Kazakh (36%) or Turkish (16%).  
 The declaration of multiple responses was not surprising since there was ethnic proximity 
between Kazakhs and Turks historically and linguistically. As noted in Chapter 3, ethnicity is not 
a static and exclusive treat. It also depends on the assumption of belief in shared ancestry, 
common history, and self-identification. 
In addition to self-ethnic identification, we examined the importance of self-identification 
with Turkey and being Kazakh. The findings were remarkable. Seventy-two percent of 
participants stated that being Turkish was “very important” when they define themselves, while 
22% stated it to be “important.” Only 4% acquired average importance to it, and 1% said it was 
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“not important.” “Not only can dispersed ethnic communities possess intense feelings of place 
attachment for regions outside of the ‘ancestral homeland,’ but they may also display cultural 
practices and attitudes hybridized with those of their ‘host’  society” (Diener, 2013:465). 
 
Figure 13: Self-identification with Turkey and being Kazakh 
 The answers and their respective percentages to the question of importance of self-
identification with being Kazakh are as follows: “very important” for 66%, “important” for 27%, 
“average” for 4%, “does not matter” for 1%, and “not important” for 1%. 
 Seventy-three percent of participants stated Turkish was their mother tongue. Ten percent 
listed the Kazakh language, and 7% declared both Turkish and Kazakh language as their mother 
tongue. 
 To the question “do you feel assimilated?” Twenty-six percent of participants said “yes,” 
Sixty-nine percent said no. Moreover, the sample embraced a various identities: there were three 
types of responses. Five percent of participants did not state their thoughts. The question “to 
which ethnic group do you belong?” Sixteen percent of the sample answered “Turk,” 36% 
answered “Kazakh” and 39% answered “Kazakh Turk.”  
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Figure 14: Assimilation 
 
Alternatively, 25% of the sample declared that culture and religion were the most 
important factors in nationality, 20% stated language and religion, 16% stated culture and 
language, 15% stated language and nation, 13% stated culture and nation, and 8% stated nation 
and religion. 
 
Figure 15: Factors of Nationality 
 
Kazakh Ethnic Identity 
 Overall, 93% of the Kazakhs in Turkey attached importance to a Kazakh identity for 
several reasons. For example, one of the participants stated: “It was given by Allah, and 
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profoundly I am very happy with being Kazakh Turkish.” Considering the source of ethnic 
identity is religion can work for Kazakh community in Turkey. The question “what are the two 
important components of nationality?” Fifty-three percent of participants paid more attention the 
religion with other characteristics of ethnicity such as culture, language or race. For example, 
“culture and religion” was favored by 25%.  “Language and religion” also were the second 
highest option for twenty percent of participants, and third was “nation and religion” eight 
percent. Kazakhs in Turkey presented a faithful side to Islam and stated religion as an important 
factor of identity. Furthermore, “How do you feel being in Turkey?” was the other question 
which sought to answer of self-identification of the participants and was replied: 
 P1: It is the country where one Muslim can live comfortably that is why I feel good to be 
here. Our view of life and ideologies are similar, maybe I feel it in this way because I was raised 
here. I am very happy. 
 P9: Praise be to God, I am here. 
 P2: I am very thankful to God, and fortunately, my parent came to Turkey. First, praise to 
God then to my parents
33
.   
 P3: I am pleased because I am free to speak and pray in Turkey. 
 P4: I think that for benefits of our nation and our religion, Turkey is the best country. 
 P5: I am a Turk, because of I was raised in Turkey, although my homeland is 
Kazakhstan. I praise to God. I am pleased.  
 
 Participants emphasized the importance of religion and their happiness of being in 
Turkey within different emotions and feelings. 
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 P represents participant. 
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 The Kazakh identity is also supported by ethnic consciousness. Some of participants 
stated their plans for future when asked the question “what is your future citizenship and 
residency plan? Do you want to go back? What do you do for retention your ethnic identity” 
Some of the responses are: 
 P 3: I will stay in Turkey, because Kazakhstan Kazakhs sees us as other type of Kazakhs, 
and their officials act as if we are different. In here, I am Kazakh so I will not go. 
 P 8: I pay more attention to cooking our own food. 
 P 6: I organized the weddings in the Kazakh traditional way. 
 P 4: By speaking Kazakh dialect and practicing religion frequently.  
 P 10: I am attending cultural trips, associations’ activities, language courses. I am willing 
to teach our culture to our Turkish daughter-in-law.  
 P 11: Speaking Kazakh dialect, and teaching culture to Kazakh child.  
 P12: There is no oppression, so I do not have any problems with preserving the values. 
 P 13: I try to save our traditional exercises a lot. I can play the Dombira.  
The response to the question “what do you think about the relationship between Kazakhs 
and Turks” the participants: “we are the same,” “we have kinship,” “we have the same origins,” 
and “our ancestry is mutual” 42 % of the time, while about 10% though that the culture is the 
same. 
 Many responses of participants supported that, on the whole, hybridization theory can 
explain the formation of Kazakh ethnic identity. Moreover, Kazakhs called Turkey their 
‘fatherland.’ This idea will be explained in chapter 7. The participants created a new form of 
identity which stemmed from beliefs coming from the same ancestry, culture, and religion.  
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Kazakh Identity and Homogenization  
 The pieces of a universal culture and features of a newly created modern life can be 
traced among young generations of Kazakhs. Adolescents tend to be more open to innovations 
than their parents. The controversy between the view that adolescents are more global than their 
local families and the conservativeness of the first generation immigrants has attracted scholars 
(Zimmerman, 2006). It is fair to say that young generations embrace the practices of their host 
country. In doing so, they create a hybrid form, although the older generation preserves its 
distinct ethnic identity. The idea is that adolescents are a group “which is increasingly form 
multicultural identities they grow up knowing diverse cultural beliefs and behaviors” (Jensen, 
2003). Phinney (2000) found the gap between adolescents and their parents among Armenian 
and Vietnamese immigrants, while Mexican immigrants’ ethnic identity retention did not vary 
between generations. 
 McDonaldisation is a form of homogenization that relies on spreading the values of fast-
food restaurants that increasingly control not only the rest of the world, as well as America’s 
system (Pieterse, 1996). The most prominent form of homogenization is daily practices that are 
the products of Western values, ideas, or ideologies. Eating fast food at “McDonald’s has 
certainly become a ‘sign’ that, among other things, one is in tune with contemporary lifestyle” 
(Ritzer, 2004:12). Nine percent of participants stated their favorite food as hamburgers. Twelve 
percent of participants would like to watch and listen to Turkish, Kazakh, and English, although 
3% provided that South Korean music and TV programs. Homogenization theory or 
Westernization does not fit Kazakh ethnic identity. 
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Kazakh identity and Polarization 
Polarization, also called heterogenization and differentiation, relates focus in barriers that 
prevent flows that would influence cultures to become similar (Ritzer, 2010). The intensification 
of local cultures that are transnational makes those local cultures part of the globe. 
Heterogenization, as does homogenization, underestimates the fact that globalization is a process 
of flow of goods, ideas, and individuals. Robertson (2001) stresses that the increasing global 
flows do not mean the world becoming similar. The globalization process does not completely 
eradicate local cultures. In time, different cultural groups create separate heterogonous entities 
that are very different. Kazakhs in Turkey emphasize that they belong to a world which is 
dominantly Muslim and has Turkic roots. There are two reasons that make them happy in 
Turkey. First, Turkey is an Islamic country. Second, Turkey is an ethnically Turkic country. Data 
shows that kinship and religion were enough to ensure nationality. However, the effort to protect 
Kazakh culture, ethnicity, and traditions with the desire to preserve this heritage could support 
that there is, to some extent, a polarization among Kazakhs in Turkey. 
Kazakhs belong to Islamic civilization and in the capitalist dominated world, they wish to 
keep their nationality, language, and religious. According to polarization, “Mc World” is harmful 
to local cultures until it raises “Jihad” as an awareness to protect local identity and belong to a 
particular group, whether national, ethnic, or religious (Barber B. R., 1995). This seems to apply 
to Kazakhs in Turkey as well.  One of my participants told me why we should not try to be more 
Western by following the European Union. He said: “We need to stay together, as Kazakhs and 
Turks. The outside, the West, is against us. They will not let us breathe. You see how they do not 
like Turkey. We are barbarians for them, it will never change. So, we need to stay together.” 
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Kazakhs defined themselves as belonging to a broader cultural and ethnic entity, but this 
is not an indication that they are part of a civilizational conflict. Even if the homogenization and 
polarization perspectives are significant to a certain extent, they do not to answer how a hybrid 
Kazakh ethnic identity constructed and what is its scope of Kazakh and Turkish cultural elements 
on this identity.  
Kazakh Identity and Hybridization 
 
Hybridization is different but related to integration in which interdependence develops 
while antecedents remain the same (Dear & Burried, 2005). The Kazakhs of Turkey, created a 
new identity. When they encountered Turkish societal customs, they embraced the new culture 
and its traditions.  
 Pieterse’s approach considers hybridity as the cultural product of globalization. It is 
correct in some aspects. It fair to say that hybridiy stems from globalization, and the help 
international migration is very crucial factor for hybridity. On the other hand, she considers 
hybridization in a global context insdead of in-between space. Bhabha explains that it is almost 
imposible to find some fixid identities. He considers hybridity as an “in-between” space. He also 
points out a “Third Space” where negotiation and recreation of identities takes place (Bhabha 
1996; Bhabha 1994).  
Cultural hybridization emphasizes that homogenization and polarization theories need to 
pay attention to both fragmentation and unification, simultaneously reinforcing a consciousness 
of cultural difference as well as common identity. In addition, intercultural relations and 
incorparation of diverse cultures must be considered in a more comprehensive approach, like 
hybridization. After two different cultures encounter, individuals first select particular elements, 
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practices, and values from the new culture. Then they replace or combine these with older 
cultural values and characteristics, leading to a new cultural experience. This is called 
hybridization.  
On the other hand, some cultural norms could not always able to find a space in new 
cultural hybridization. Since hybridization focuses on how a new features could embrace new 
components with previous one, the some prominent features of cultural attributes can be found 
after the integration of new culture. Moreover, immigrants tend to crate new form and combine 
their identity and host country’s identity as hybridization. 
Cultural globalization, or hybridization, means the blurred relationships among cultures. 
The cross-cultural relations between different cultures when they interact and select particular 
points from each other, and then reinterpret the new particular side which is a product of both 
different cultures (Cohen,2007:2). In respect to this, multiple directions of cultural flows are the 
main characteristic side of universal culture . Cultural convergence cannot be reduced as Western 
and American values. 
Cultural globalization as hybridization and Kazakhs in Turkey 
 Historically, it is difficult explain Kazakh culture regarding territorial bonds using 
Kazakhs living in Turkey as subjects. Since immigrants have a deterritorialized position, they 
struggle to construct their cultural heritage. This makes Kazakhs retain softer cultural 
characteristics such as traditional stories, and traditional narratives. One example is the construct 
of ‘shezhyres’ – family threes in the Kazakh language, which include seven generations of 
family member and allow Kazakhs to keep track of relatives in order to obtain permission to 
marriage. In the Kazakh culture, must provide a ‘shezhyre’ in order to prove that you do not have 
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a kinship relationship with the person you want to marry. Kazakhs are allowed to marry people 
only outside their clan, which includes seven generations of their family. This is an important 
tradition for Kazakhs in Turkey. Another example would be Kazakh tea, which is an important 
part of being Kazakh in Turkey. Kazakh tea is served with hot milk and black pepper – without 
any sugar. Kazakhs give historical and emotional meaning to it. 
We gain new understanding of hybridization by examining the Kazakhs in Turkey. As 
rational creature, individuals balance the ascription of ethnic identity and social situations. The 
sample also fits rational-choice theory. They give legitimacy to their actions by emphasizing 
their Turkic values in both culture and ancestry. Their willingness to emphasize Turkic roots 
could be an assurance that different hybridization processes are going on. Fourty-six participants 
stated that Turks and Kazakhs are ethnically the same, while 6 participants stated that they are 
brother countries. Territorial relations require special attention because participants referred to 
Turkey as their ‘fatherland’ while calling Xinjiang an Autonomous Region, and Kazakhstan their 
‘motherland.’   
 The linguistic features and eating habits of Kazakhs suggest how hybrid identity is 
constructed through creolization of popular culture. Thirty-four percent  of participants stated 
their favorite dishes were included Turkish cuisine (Turkish Dumplings 12 %, Imambayildi 7 %, 
Baklava 8%, Cigkofte 5 %, and Turkish tea 2 %), while traditional Kazakh foods were favorited 
by 24% (Kazakh Dumplings 17%, Kazakh tea 7 %).  
 Religion is also a characteristic feature of Kazakhs in Turkey. Their views make them 
more at home in Turkey. Thus it is very understandable that their immigration was triggered by 
the religionist limitations of the Manchu Dynasty. Religion by itself was not the only 
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determining factor that led them to migrate to Turkey. Thus, they did choose to stay in Pakistan 
where Islam is the predominant religion. However, the effects are not negligible and have had an 
impact the Kazakhs’ hybridization with Turks in Turkey. 
Furniture and the new “Fatherland” as an example of hybrid forms 
 As Cancline (2003: 279) states, since 1980s, the term ‘hybridity’ stresses a new kind of 
creation which embraces features from someone’ past while it is also consisting of new 
implications which could be similar with previous form. It is fair to say that humans, architecture 
and furniture are subject for globalization. The tension between anti-global and pro-global forces 
effects architectural globalization (Eldemery, 2009). While opponent of globalization forces try 
to safeguard and cooperate with indigenous architectural traditions, forms, and decorative 
motives, pro-globalization forces encourage innovative tools, technologies, and new fashions. 
Globalization is often seen as homogenization. Because hybridization is emphasized, it can also 
be considered as heterogeneity. The furniture preference of Kazakhs exhibits a hybridized form. 
Seventy-five percent of participants placed both Turkish-style sofas and traditional ground sofas 
in the same room – a very visible hybrid form of globalization. Nine percent of participants only 
owned Turkish sofas, while 16% owned Kazakh ground sofas. 
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Figure 16: Furniture Type 
 
 On the other hand, both individual and group experience can obtain new meaning (Isajiw 
1993); new visible ethnic patterns, new collected experiences, especially in the case of creating a 
new meaning for the community. This process involves reconstruction of ethnic identity (Isajiw 
1993:16). Therefore, labelling the new county as their fatherland, the participants created a new 
kind of legitimacy for their migration. By giving it a new meaning, fatherland, the participants 
reinterpreted their position in society while ethnic identity was still developing. Eighty-seven 
percent of the sample answered the question “how do you define Turkey?” by saying that they 
viewed it as their fatherland. Below this question, three multiple choice answers were provided: 
“host country,”  “homeland,” and “please write.” While 87% of the participants wrote fatherland, 
10% preferred to call Turkey as their homeland. 
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                                                                 CHAPTER 7   
                                                              CONCLUSION 
Turkey is a country with paths to other places for immigrants, where major migrations 
have taken place during the last 150 years. Kazakhs, representing a very small group have rarely 
been included in field studies. Such studies have been largely conducted by non-Turkish 
foreigners who consider Kazakhs as refuges in Turkey. Turkish researchers, on the other hand, 
have preferred to study their entrepreneurship and economic efforts. In the current study, 
Kazakhs’ distinctive ethnic status was investigated. Indeed, my Kazakh friends’ opinion of being 
Turkish helped me research the issue and my curiosity about the Turkic world played a role in 
my selection of the issue. The empirical findings about ethnic identity formation of Kazakhs in 
Turkey ensured to understand hybrid identity formation. The following section briefly describes 
the study. 
 The three prominent approaches the homogenization, polarization and hybridization 
perspectives, and their explanatory power on Kazakh ethnic identity in Turkey was examined.  
The sample of 93 Kazakhs were chosen based on snowball-sampling. Empirical data were 
collected through questionnaire which on average took twenty minutes. Multiple-choice 
questions were asked, and several open-ended questions were also asked. Having open-ended 
question provided some qualitative data on ethnic identity. Participants’ profile characteristics, 
ethnic identity retention, and self-identification were also explored.  
 In short, even though Kazakhs living in Turkey lack proper education, the new generation 
is very involved in acquiring education. Most of the participants were born in Turkey, while 
some was born in Kazakhstan, China or Pakistan. Their exodus occurred in the 1950s. The key 
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factor in coming to Turkey was the ethnicity of the Turks. Believing in shared ancestry among 
Kazakhs and Turks made their final destination preferences favor Turkey. 
 Kazakh ethnic identity was retained by attending Kazakh associations’ functions, 
spending time trying to find about Kazakhs’ past, and speaking the Kazakh language at home. 
Although Kazakhs give special importance to their culture, food preferences, media, ethnic 
friendship preferences among participants suggests there is less Kazakh ethnic identity retention. 
The most common ethnic identity retention involved attending Kazakh meetings. Ethnic-
marriage, however, was the most un-important factor for 69 per cent of the sample. Surprisingly, 
generation differentiation did not appear.  
Kazakh Identity and Turkey 
 The notion of a “transnational network of immigrant communities” was coined by Lusia 
Veronis (2006) to conceptualize a group that cuts across multiple-borders but that is situated 
within one particular locale. She explains that this concept, “ undercores the multiple layers of 
transnational experiences, practices, and identities that compose this group”(pg.18). Society is a 
homogenous community and consists of a variety of subgroups. Some are formed along national 
lines, while others are based on common interests regardless of nationality such as refugees, 
women, youth, and seniors (Veronis, 2006:19). The cross-border relations among these sub-
groups help us to understand the structure of the Kazakh community in Turkey and how its 
identity is constructed. We need to pay more attention is to influence of hosty county on identity 
formation, Kazakhs’ self-identification involves three different identities. These three sided 
relations: the Kazakh self-identification for sub-group identity, religionist identity and a hybrid 
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identity can be found. The boundaries has changed by moving a different country which 
influence these three sided ethnic identity. 
 Kazakh identity in Turkey can be explained by hybridization theory. In short, Kazakhs 
attached a new kind of hybrid identity with more emphasis on Turkic roots. The Kazakhs in 
Turkey reconstructed their ethnic identity which is not a product of assimilated fragile identity 
through globalization trends, but it is a new form of a living cultural and ethnic identity which 
carries its own values, preferences and historical treasures from its past but acquires new traits 
from its Turkic identity at the same time. Kazakhs obtained a comprehensive identity which can 
be explained by hybrid identity construction; ethnic identity retention and self-identification as 
Turkish-Kazakh. 
The hyphenated furniture concept could be seen in every Kazakh living room. Most of 
the sample combined the Turkish style sofa with Kazakh ground sofa in the same room, showing 
how individuals construct a new kind of form by combining one’s own historical features with a 
host culture’s life style. One less visible evidence was also found among participants-- 
fatherland. This hybrid idea occurred with rational choice theory which argues that individuals 
recreate their identities according to their benefits. We can also present the fatherland notion 
with one participants’ own world “We came to our fatherland after you, Turk, came. Our 
differences are just 1300 years, you came earlier that’s all. Here is our fatherland.” 
Direction for Further Research 
 This study’s research about one of the Turkic groups will help me to research more about 
ethnic identity formation among other Turkic groups. For further research, the Kirgiz group that 
migrated to Turkey in the 1950s merits study, especially the ethnic identity formation of the 
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Kirgiz group. A research in particular in the city of Van where many Kirgiz group are located 
and the issues Kirgiz experienced with Kurdish citizens in the city may provide different 
findings. In addition, new insights information may be gained in studying ethnic Kirgiz in 
Istanbul.  
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APPENDIX A- INFORMED CONSENT FROM 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study titled “ The Kazakhs in Turkey”. This study is 
being conducted by Aslihan Yeniceri, for master thesis at Iowa State University to investigate 
the Kazakh immigration integration process in Turkey. 
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary at all time. You can choose not to participate at all 
or to leave the study at any time. Regardless of your decision, there will be no effect on your 
relationship with the researcher or any other consequences. 
You are being asked to take in this study because you are Kazakh who are living in Turkey as a 
home country. 
If you are agreeing to participate, you will be asked to take a survey which consists of questions 
and gaps for your answers. You will try to write your answers. This survey should last around 
one hour. 
What you write during this survey will remain anonymous and cannot be linked to you in any 
way. No identifying information about you will be collected at any point during the study. Once 
your survey is over, there will be no way to withdraw your response from the study because the 
survey will contain no identifying information. 
Study data will be kept in paper format in the researcher’s locked bag. Access to the paper data 
will be protected the investigator. Only the investigator will have access to the data. 
There are no risks associated with this study. If you are agree to participate, you will not receive 
a gift. 
If you have any questions regarding to the survey or this research project in general, please 
contact the principal investigator, Aslihan Yeniceri, at 515-817-3947 or via e-mail at 
yeniceri@iastate.edu. If you have any question about your rights as a research participant, please 
contact the Iowa State University IRB at IRB@iastate.edu 
By taking part in this survey, you are indicating your consent to participate in this study. 
 
Aslihan Yeniceri 
Master student in Political Science  
Iowa State University 
yeniceri@iastate.edu 
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APPENDIX B-KAZAKH IMMIGRANT BACKGROUND QUESTIONNAIRE 
Before the survey, please fill out the following background information: 
 
1. Age: _________   
 
2.  Gender:               Female                Male 
 
3. Marital Status:     Single                 Married     
 
4.  Mother Tongue: _______________       
 
5.  Which languages 
     Kazakh           
     Turkish  
     Russian   
     Arabic 
     Chinese    
     English 
     
6.  Which degree did you complete? 
 
     Elementary School         High School          Bachelor Degree          
     Master Degree                PhD 
 
7.   At what age did you begin studying Turkish?______  
8.   How long have you been in Turkey?_____ 
9.   Where were you born?________________________ 
10. Have you ever visited a Turkish-speaking country except Turkey?  
     Yes   
     No  
     If so, what was your trip’s aim? 
________________________________________________________________________ 
11. Where was your country, before Turkey? 
      Kazakhstan  
      East Turkestan 
      Other (please write) __________________ 
Thank you! 
Now, please turn over and start the survey. 
 
(This 11 questions was prepared to get background information about participants, and survey 
questions are above) 
Survey Questionnaires 
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1) Are you working/ studying? 
Student 
Employee    
Retired    
 
If employee, in what sector do you work/ if retired, in what sector did you 
work? (Please, chose)? 
 
Public 
Sector 
Private 
Sector 
Self-
employment 
Non-for-
profit 
organization 
Domestic 
or 
Homecare 
Other 
      
     
2) Did you have problems finding a job? 
      Yes  
      No 
If so, what problems have you encountered when looking for work?  
Language  Qualification Discrimination No 
legal 
job 
Limited right 
to work 
Sickness Other 
       
  
3) How many years have you worked? 
____ 
4) How much money do you earn monthly?  
        0- 320tl          320-846tl             846-1500tl               1500-2500tl 
        2500- Above 
 
 
 
5) In your opinion, does your current job match with your skills and 
training? 
  Yes      
  No 
v 
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6) Do you have a pension/retirement plans? 
SSK 
BAGKUR 
Individual retirement plan 
          I don’t have 
Other (please write)                    _____________________________ 
7) Do you have special insurance? 
House 
Earthquake 
Automobile 
Other (please write)                _____________________________ 
 
8) Are you staying your own house? 
Yes 
No, rent  
9) How many rooms are there in your house? 
___________   
10) If you are a tenant, how much money is your rent? 
___________ 
11) What is your house location? 
Central 
Rural 
 
12) In your house, in the living rooms which furniture you have? 
Kazakh ground traditional sofa group 
Turkish style sofa group 
Both in the same room 
 
 
13) Do you have a T.C citizenship? 
Yes  
No  
 
F
C F
C F
C F
C 
F
C F
C F
C 
F
C F
C 
F
C F
C 
F
C F
C 
F
C 
 F
 F
 F
F
C 
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 F
 F
F
C 
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 F
128 
14) Did you have a problem learning Turkish? 
Yes 
    No 
If your answer is yes, what were the major problems learning Turkish? 
(please mark) 
Motivation Time to study Information  Other 
    
 
15) In your opinion, are Turkish and Kazakh languages close language 
linguistically? 
Very close Close Different Very different 
    
 
16)  
 Very Good Good Average Poor  Very poor 
How well do you speak 
Turkish? 
     
How well do you speak 
Kazakh language? 
     
How well do you speak 
Russian? 
     
How well do you speak 
Chinese? 
     
How well do you speak 
Arabic? 
     
How well do you know 
Turkey and Turkish 
History? 
     
How well do you know 
Kazak History 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F
C F
C 
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16) 
How do you 
often engages 
in Kazakhs 
Associations’ 
meetings (toys, 
weddings, 
picnics, 
concerts, etc.) 
Often  Sometimes Never 
   
How frequently 
do you speak 
Kazakh 
language at 
hime 
   
    
 
17) 
 Very Important Important Average No matter Not important 
How strong is 
your self-
identification 
with Turkey? 
     
How strong 
is your self-
identification 
with being 
Kazakh? 
     
 
17) Are you married? 
Yes                 , what is ethnicity of your spouse?____________________ 
 
No 
              If no, Is getting married to a Turk problem for you? (Could you describe 
why?) 
      _______________________________________________________________ 
      _______________________________________________________________ 
      _______________________________________________________________ 
      _______________________________________________________________ 
      _______________________________________________________________ 
F
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18) Do you vote for Turkish elections? 
Yes, in every elections 
Yes, sometimes 
I don’t prefer to vote 
 
19) Do Kazakh immigrants have adequate political rights in Turkey? 
     Yes  
     No 
 
20) In your opinion, could a Kazak be elected? 
Yes  
No 
21) In your opinion, is a Kazakh in Turkey elected as a following? 
Member of Parliament  
Mayor 
Local representative 
None 
22) Do you think you are able to equally access to rights of the institution of 
welfare state? 
Health 
Education 
Religionist Services 
Housing 
Employment 
Freedom of religion 
Political decision making 
Social rights 
Sport 
23) Is there anything you have to abandon because of your immigration? 
Cultural values 
Religion Rituals 
Dress code 
Food preferences 
None 
   Do you think Turkish government’s policies have an impact on that? 
F
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    Yes 
    No 
24) Where your food is came from? 
Turkey 
Kazakhstan 
Chine/ East Turkestan  
Russia 
Germany 
Other (please write)                      _____________________________ 
25) Could you rank the foods from your favorite ? 
Manti(Turkiskish Dumplings)  
Kazak Mantisi (Kazakh Dumplings)  
Ozbek Mantisi (Uzbek Dumplings)  
Makrube  
Imambayildi  
Baklava  
Cigkofte  
Beshbarmak  
Hamburger  
Toy pilavi  
Turkish tea  
Turkish coffee  
Kazakh tea  
Ice tea  
 
26) What are the ethnic origins of your closets friends? 
1.  :________________________ 
2.  :_________________________ 
3.  : _________________________                     
27) Do you have close Turkish friend? 
Yes  
No 
 
28) Do you have close friends who live in Kazakhstan? 
Yes 
No 
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29) Do you have close friends who live in China/ East Turkestan?     
Yes 
    No 
30)  Do you feel a stronger attachment towards Kazakhs than other ethnic 
groups? 
Yes 
No 
Character  
31) Do you feel more comfortable among Kazakhs than other ethnic groups? 
Strongly disagree 
Somewhat disagree 
Somewhat agree 
Strongly agree  
 
32) In your opinion,  in what extend some traditions such as narratives, 
grandma stories and Shezhyre have importance? 
Important 
Average 
Not Important 
      
33) How do you protect you ethnic identity? 
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________ 
 
  
30) Do you feel ethnically assimilated? 
Yes            
No 
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31) Do you define yourself as a Kazakh or Turk? 
 
 
32) Do you feel there are anti-immigrant attitudes in Turkey? 
Yes 
No 
If so, please could you describe it? 
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________ 
 
33) How many hours in a week do you watch television in Turkish? 
____________ 
34) How many hours in a week do you watch television in Kazakh? 
____________ 
35) For newspaper, magazine and radio which languages do you prefer? 
Turkish 
Kazakh 
 
36) In your opinion, do Turkish media cover Kazakhs’ way? 
Yes 
No  
37) What is your preferred music? 
Kazakh music 
Turkish music 
Other (please write)           ____________________________ 
38) How do you feel about being in Turkey? 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
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39) How do you define Turkey? 
Homeland 
Host country 
Other (please write)   ________________ 
40) In your opinion, which of the following are the two most important 
elements that go to make up a national identity? 
(Chose 2) 
Race Culture Language Religion 
    
 
41) In your opinion, what do you think about the most important features 
of Turkness, (What makes someone Turks?), please number them 
according to importance degree from 1 to 10 (Write 1 for the most 
important, 10 to less important feature). 
To feel as a Turk  
To born in Turkey  
To share Turkic culture  
To master in both Turkish and 
other Turkic languages 
 
To exercise citizens’ rights in 
Turkey 
 
To immigrate to Turkey  
To have at least one nationality 
parents (One Turkish father or 
mother) 
 
To be Muslim  
To know Turkish history  
To know OGUZ KAGAN ( the 
oldest Turkic khan) 
 
To distinguish the general Turkic 
notion  ( is being Turkic related to 
be Turkey Turk ) 
 
Other (Please write)  
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42) In your opinion, what is relationship between being a Kazakh and 
being a Turk? 
____________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
43) What is your future citizenship and residency plan? (Do you want to 
go back?) 
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
44) In your opinion, is the Turkic Union possible? ( Could you define your 
ideas) 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
__________________ 
If so, what could be the role of Turkey’s role in this union? 
  
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________ 
45) Do you think, are there irritating questions in this survey?  
          
__________________________________________________________________
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__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
                                                                    Thank you for your attendance. 
 
